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1.0 Background  
There is a trend of compromising verification testing to address the cost and schedule 
constraints, which poses a high-risk posture for programs/projects.  Current and emerging 
aerospace scientific and/or human exploration programs continue to pose new technological 
challenges. These technological challenges combined with finite budgets and truncated schedules 
are forcing designers, scientists, engineers, and managers to push technologies to their physical 
limits. In addition, budget and schedule pressures challenge how those technologies/missions are 
verified.   
A clear understanding of the different verification processes is needed to ensure the proper 
verification of the technology within the mission (i.e., capabilities, advantages, and limitations).  
The goal of verification is to prove through test, analysis, inspection, and/or demonstration that a 
product provides its required function while meeting the performance requirements. It is 
important that verification yield understanding of representative performance under worst-case 
conditions so that margins to failure can be evaluated for proposed applications.  The 
capabilities, advantages, and limitations of the testing and inspection performed at each level are 
different, and the risk incurred by omitting a verification step depends on the level of integration 
as well as Mission, Environment, Application and Lifetime (MEAL).   
This paper focuses on verification processes. The goal of the verification process is to ensure the 
given avionics technology could be safely implemented on the given MEAL consistent with the 
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2.0 Executive Summary 
This paper describes selection of the verification processes taking into account MEAL and risk 
posture.  This paper compares common verification tests and inspections by describing the 
capabilities, advantages, and limitations of the verification depending on the level of integration 
(i.e., part-, board-, box-level, etc.) being used. When properly implemented, these tests ensure 
that the given avionics system and technology can be safely used on the given human-rated or 
robotic program with acceptable risks in safety critical spaceflight applications.  
As demands for improved performance in spaceflight programs increase, and budget and 
schedule pressures remain constrained, the temptation has increased to implement new or 
previously flown avionics technologies, including COTS technologies, into human-rated and 
robotic spaceflight programs.  
Spaceflight programs are incentivized to use these avionics technologies to reduce design, 
development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) costs, to meet programmatic schedules, and increase 
system performance. However, in some cases, these technologies that have not been fully vetted 
according to procedures appropriate for operation in a different space environment, or for their 
intended application, environment and life cycle have been inserted into space hardware, 
introducing risks to the spaceflight systems. To avoid introducing such risks, it is critical to 
understand the risk impact on the proposed technology in terms of the Mission definition and its 
related Environment, Application and Lifetime (MEAL) along with the associated risk posture.   
The motivation is to combat common myths or misunderstandings about verification, such as:  
1) One size fits all;  
2) It is not important to understand the verification process including capabilities, 
advantages and limitation at different integration level;  
3) New technologies have sufficient reliability built-in and so require no additional 
screening or qualification; 
4) There is no need to do any further verification beyond the manufacturer’s data on COTS 
technologies;  
5) Cost, budget and schedule pressures provide adequate reason for deviating from accepted 
qualification and screening procedures;   
6) Flight heritage allows omission of critical verification steps.  
This paper describes a MEAL and risk posture base verification process for selection and 
verification of avionics technology including COTS parts, board and/or box technologies. The 
paper presents a set of common verification tests and inspections matrix with comparisons of 
each verification test or inspection by describing the capabilities, advantages and limitations of 
the test or inspection depending on the level of integration (i.e., part, board, box, etc.) being used. 
The paper also uses the concept of technology readiness level (TRL) centered on MEAL to 
assess flight heritage, providing steps required to qualify any design and to help assess whether 
the “heritage design” is or not suitable for the given mission. 
The paper’s strategy focuses on MEAL and verification assurance. When properly implemented, 
these tests and inspections ensure that the technologies passing these tests can be safely used on 
the given flight program with acceptable risks even in safety-critical spaceflight applications.  
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Key take away messages are:  
1. MEAL (mission, mission environment, application and lifetime of the mission or application) 
a. The understanding of the MEAL requires a complete picture of how avionics and 
technologies are to be used effectively.  The considerations summarized in the MEAL 
allow designers to effectively choose parts for their best performance in a given 
architecture.  Emphasizing one of the MEAL elements without understanding the 
others can compromise the integrity and performance of the parts and the mission 
success. 
2. Verification process driven by MEAL and mission risk posture 
a. The MEAL suggests appropriate strategies for mission design, development, 
implementation, and defines end-of-mission conditions. It also informs/bounds the 
verification approach and processes through all stages. The selected verification 
processes must ensure the adequacy of the design is commensurate with the risk that 
is acceptable to the project. 
b. Verification processes should show that the end product conforms to its specified 
requirements at all levels (i.e., part-, board-, box-level, subsystem-level, and system-
level). 
c. Skipping part-level testing is often done to reduce the cost and schedule of testing.  
However, cost savings will be realized only if no failures are detected during testing 
at the higher integration level, assuming this higher integration level testing is 
sufficient to catch individual parts that could fail during a mission. If there were any 
failures detected at a higher level, then it would have a negative impact on cost and 
schedule.  Moreover, testing at higher integration levels reduces knowledge of design 
margin and margin to failures. Vulnerabilities not detected during verification process 
may lead to adverse consequences ranging from degraded performance to LOM or 
LOC. 
d. In general, the higher the integration, the lower the overall acceleration factor1.  If 
tested at the part level, then each individual part could be subjected to maximum 
stress to achieve the largest possible acceleration factor. 
e. The same test conducted at different integration levels yields different information, 
both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
                                                        
1 http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/apr/section1/apr14.htm 
The goal of this paper is to enhance awareness of the: 1) capabilities, advantages, limitations 
of verification processes; 2) related impact to risks associated with various part-, board-, and 
box-level verification testing; and 3) how risks can be managed for selection and verification 
of parts based on an integrated assurance approach focusing on MEAL and verification 
assurance.   
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3. Heritage assessment by the TRL concept centered on MEAL 
a. The use of the TRL concept centered on MEAL to assess flight heritage provides the 
steps required to qualify any design and could help assess if the “heritage design” is 
or is not suitable for the given mission. 
b. To claim “heritage”, the previous mission’s characteristics must bound those of the 
new mission in terms of environment, application, and lifetime. If these bounds are 
not realized, then the new system would have to regress to the appropriate TRL and 
be certified/verified to the predicted conditions of new mission. 
c. As noted in Government Accounting Office Best Practices reports, “The 
incorporation of advanced technologies before they are mature has been a major 
source of cost increases, schedule delays, and performance problems on weapon 
systems. Demonstrating a high level of maturity before new technologies are 
incorporated into product development programs puts those programs in a better 
position to succeed”.2,3 
In summary, there is no unique (that is, no one size fits all) solution for the selection and 
verification of the avionics system and technology, including architecture and parts assurance 
requirements, that ensures reliable safety and mission success. Understanding MEAL and risks, 
as well as adopting an attitude of “always verify” (trust but verify), is crucial.  
 The MEAL and risk posture based verification process applies to any avionics 
technology system verification, including COTS part-, board-, and box- technology 
and previously flown technology. 
 A comprehensive verification program bounded by MEAL and risk posture requires a 
full understanding of the capabilities, advantages, and limitations of verification 
testing conducted at different levels of integration.  
  
                                                        
2 GAO Best Practice, “Better Management of Technology Development can Improve Weapon System Outcomes”, NSIAD-99-
162, July 30, 1999. 
3 GAO Best Practices, “Technology Readiness Assessment Guide – Best Practices for Evaluating the Readiness of Technology 
for Use in Acquisition Programs and Projects”, August 2016. 
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3.0 Verification based on MEAL and Risk Posture 
The selection and verification of the avionics system architecture and parts technology in 
spaceflight programs begin with the mission definition and its related mission, mission 
environment, application and lifetime of the mission or application (MEAL), along with the 
accepted risk associated with the mission category and/or payload class. These factors influence 
the design, development, integration, implementation, end-of-mission conditions, and 
verification process throughout all these stages.  
Improper verification of the avionics system and technology can occur due to lack of 
understanding the program’s MEAL, risk posture, or avionics technology, skipping verification 
testing at different integration level(s), or taking vendor technical and/or qualification data at 
face value without sufficient evidence or understanding. This can expose programs to unknown 
risks arising from the implementation/use of these technologies. At the same time, the more 
complex the avionics system, the more MEAL-dependent will be the conclusion of the analysis 
of verification data.    
 
3.1 Understanding MEAL  
The selection of the avionics system architecture and parts quality assurance requirements in any 
spaceflight program begins with the mission definition and its related MEAL, along with the 
accepted risk associated with the mission category and/or payload class.  
MEAL is defined as: 
Mission:  The ultimate science goal or objective of the overall effort. The “mission” in the 
MEAL acronym identifies what type/kind of mission.  Is this a human or robotic mission? What 
are the mission category and payload classifications, and what level of risk is the mission willing 
to take? This often implies different sets of parts requirements, standards, and test criteria. 
Understanding the mission helps define the requirements associated with the environment(s), 
defines the applications to meet the mission goals, and defines the expected progression of the 
mission from development to the end of the mission. The mission helps management define the 
risk levels NASA is willing to take (i.e., risk posture is the position the mission is willing to take 
based on the MEAL risks that have been identified. There is no single, uniform standard for risk 
posture, and depending on the mission, risk posture is often a tailored approach that is based on 
the mission applications and needs).   
Environment:  The relevant ambient conditions the system would experience during the life 
cycle to accomplish the mission (e.g., thermal effects, electromagnetics effects, electrostatic 
effects, radiation effects, etc.). 
The mission environment is critical for parts as it defines the stresses experienced and ensures an 
understanding of the required operating environment, parts performance thresholds and margins, 
and non-operating conditions for active and passive parts.  Designers must consider the parts 
environmental performance specifications relative to the mission environment to specify and 
ensure required design margins. 
In summary, there is no unique (that is, no one size fits all) solution for the selection and 
verification of the avionics system and technology, including architecture and parts assurance 
requirements, that ensures reliable safety and mission success. Understanding MEAL and 
risks, as well as adopting an attitude of “always verify” (trust but verify), is crucial. 
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Application: Specific function(s) to be executed to meet the goals of the mission. The mission 
application includes the architecture and its redundancy requirements.  This enables the parts to 
be properly applied/used for an application and/or function.  Further, this gives designers an 
understanding of how parts are to be used in a sub-system or system correctly and effectively.  
Designers must consider how parts interface and interact with the rest of the electrical circuit and 
other subsystems over the entire mission. 
Lifetime: The total time during which the system must perform its intended functions, including 
subcomponent manufacturing, systems development, system implementation, system 
execution/operations, and retiring of the system to accomplish the mission. 
The mission lifetime defines the criteria for parts to be selected, applied, and tested for missions, 
so that premature failures do not affect the mission outcome. This gives designers an 
understanding of how to size the lifespan of parts and utilize them in a given architecture.  
 
3.2 Understanding Risk and Risk Posture 
For a NASA spaceflight program, the risk matrix is a management tool for communicating how 
individual issues (e.g., schedule, cost, and technical) related to a given mission are classified and 
prioritized to one another.  The risk matrix main components are: 1) the probability/likelihood of 
failing to achieve a particular outcome, and 2) the consequence/impact of failing to achieve that 
outcome.  The assessment of risk and its depiction in a risk matrix has been widely accepted by 
many communities from academia, U.S. government, and industry as a way to show the relative 
ranking of risks. 
3.2.1  Risk – Metrics and Matrices   
NASA does not have a specific risk matrix for all missions, but has allowed each program to 
develop their own matrix to fit their given mission requirements based on the respective MEAL.  
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) defined “Risk” as a measure of the potential 
inability to achieve overall program objectives within defined constraints.  For reference, Figure 
1 presents the NESC risk matrix and related definitions of the matrix elements. 
The understanding of the MEAL requires a complete synchronous picture of how avionics 
and parts technologies are to be used effectively. The considerations summarized in the 
MEAL allow designers to effectively choose parts for their best performance in a given 
architecture.  Emphasizing one of the MEAL elements without understanding the others 
can compromise the integrity and performance of the parts and the mission success.  
The MEAL suggests appropriate strategies for mission design, development, 
implementation, and defines end-of-mission conditions. It also informs/bounds the 
verification approach and processes through all stages. The selected verification processes 
must ensure the adequacy of the design is commensurate with the risk that is acceptable to 
the project. 
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Figure 1. NESC Risk Matrix and Related Definitions of the Matrix Element Definitions4 
Risk posture is the position program management is willing to take based on the MEAL and 
identified risks. There is no standard for risk posture, and depending on the mission, the 
approach taken is often tailored based on the mission applications and needs (e.g., human-rated 
versus robotic, launch vehicle versus spacecraft).  
The primary risk impact/consequence areas considered in this paper are crew safety and health, 
mission success or technical performance, and programmatic as listed in the Table 1.  
Programmatic risk impact/consequence includes cost and schedule for human-rated and robotic 
explorations.  Risk impact/consequence for human exploration missions include loss of crew 
(LOC) and loss of mission (LOM) in Safety & Health, and Mission Success or Technical 
Performance, while robotic exploration missions are focused primarily on LOM 
impact/consequence. 
                                                        
4 R. W. Malone, “Development of Risk Assessment Matrix for NASA Engineering and Safety Center”, January 2004. 
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3.2.2  Cost, Schedule and Technical Risks versus Verification Test Level   
Appendix A provides a list of common verification tests and inspections performed at different 
integration levels (i.e., the part-, board- and box-level, along with the purpose, capabilities, 
advantages, and limitations for each test and inspection). 
Based on the limitations identified in Appendix A, testing at a higher level of integration results 
in reduced ability to detect a part defect. Therefore, skipping tests at earlier integration levels 
increases the probability of a defect not being detected (e.g., Hubble Space Telescope mirrors).  
Furthermore, a failure detected at a higher integration level impacts cost and schedule due to the 
rework required to fix the problem. Finding a part issue at the fully integrated system level is 
usually expensive, time consuming, and adds risk with the disassembly, replacement or repair, 
reassembly and re-testing of the refurbished assembly (i.e., collateral damage that occurs while 
repairing the board and/or wear-out).  Notional Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this concept.  
Figure 2 shows, in a simplified represenation, the “cost to test” decreases while “cost and 
schedule impact to fix” increases as a function of performing testing at part-, board- and box-
level. This is partly because of the number of independent tests required decrease when moving 
to higher level of testing. The test cost can be lower, but the cost and schedule consequences of 
experincing a failure increase dramatically. The overall cost is only lower if there is no problem 
or failure is detected at higher levels of testing.  
 
Figure 2. Notional Cost and Schedule Impacts when Performing Testing at Part-, Board-, and Box-
Level 
Figure 3, in a simplified represenation, shows that testing at lower levels of integration improves 
ability to detect part defects.  Many part defects are masked at higher levels of integration, but 
identifying these defects will increase system reliability by reducing the likelihood of latent 
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failures.  Conversely, testing at higher levels of integration is more effective to detecting 
interactions between parts and assembly workmanship defects, which impact reliability.   
 
 
Figure 3. Notional Ability to Detect Parts Defects and Interaction between Parts when Performing 
Testing at Part-, Board-, and Box- Level 
Understanding of the human-rated or robotic mission risk posture, system architecture, and the 
system effect of part-level errors and failures is critical in selecting the parts for safety critical 
applications as well as the type of verification required (testing, inspection, screening, 
qualification, etc.). These types of effects may have impacts to safety and health as well as 
mission success or technical performance. 
Appendix A supports the conclusion that considerations of safety and health, mission success, 
technical performance, and programmatic risk impacts/consequences are optimized by 
implementing testing as early as possible during the development process. 
3.3 Understanding Flight Heritage 
Heritage as defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary is “something transmitted by or acquired 
from a predecessor,” similar to legacy as “something transmitted by or received from an ancestor 
or predecessor or from the past.”  In the spaceflight environment, flight heritage commonly 
refers to a successfully flown design or qualified hardware, and/or software systems.  Many 
programs have used claims of flight heritage to argue that their proposed hardware and/or 
software are at a technology readiness level (TRL) higher than 6 (TRL>6).  It is further argued 
that minimal review is required, which potentially creates a false sense of security for the use of 
the respective hardware and/or software in their specific mission.  
In the past, NASA has experienced failures rooted on the implementation of flight heritage 
hardware.  Two examples of programs that suffered mission failures are: 1) Genesis Spacecraft, 
and 2) the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Launch Pad 39A Flame Trench.  In these examples to 
be discussed in Section 6.1, the Mishap Investigation Boards (MIBs) had common findings 
including the use of “heritage hardware or design” without properly evaluating the environment, 
application/implementation and life time, lack of appropriate review by design team and review 
panels, and lack of effective systems engineering. Expanded Guidance for NASA Systems 
Engineering5 has provided guidelines for heritage review and reuse of a product. 
                                                        
5 “Expanded Guidance for NASA Systems Engineering”, Volume 1: Systems Engineering Practices, March 2016, pages 135, 139 
and 142. 
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As noted in Government Accounting Office Best Practices reports, “The incorporation of 
advanced technologies before they are mature has been a major source of cost increases, 
schedule delays, and performance problems on weapon systems. Demonstrating a high level of 
maturity before new technologies are incorporated into product development programs puts 
those programs in a better position to succeed”.6,7 
 
  
For example, a part in one application may experience different utilization and stress from that in 
another application, or the radiation environment may be different due to a change in orbit or 
mission duration.  In addition, to say “it flew with no observed anomalies” may be misleading 
since some anomalies may be hard to detect at system level unless specific monitoring was 
employed, or because the previous mission duration was insufficient for a latent weakness to 
surface.  In many cases, for complex parts (e.g., field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)), 
logical errors are masked and never become apparent to mission operators. Whether the error is 
detected depends on the state of the device/mission when the error occurs.  The same error, 
occurring at a different time or under different conditions in the mission could have different 
consequences. 
3.3.1  MEAL & TRL Concepts to Assess Flight Heritage 
The following two notional scenarios illustrate the use of TRL and the MEAL concepts to assess 
heritage (i.e. successfully flown technologies achieved TRL >6).  Each figure represents the 
respective MEAL boundaries. 
 Scenario 1: The Blue Round Mission was successfully flown. The Orange Star Mission 
wants to use the same technology. 
                                                        
6 GAO Best Practice, “Better Management of Technology Development can Improve Weapon System Outcomes”, NSIAD-99-
162, July 30, 1999. 
7 GAO Best Practices, “Technology Readiness Assessment Guide – Best Practices for Evaluating the Readiness of Technology 
for Use in Acquisition Programs and Projects”, August 2016. 
In this paper, the team decided to use the TRL concept centered on MEAL to assess 
heritage since it provides the steps required to qualify any new design and could help assess 
if the “heritage design” is or is not suitable for the given mission, shown in Table 2.  
For any program, the mission characteristics defines MEAL. Thus, to claim “heritage”, the 
previous mission’s characteristics must bound those of the new mission in terms of 
environment, application, and lifetime. If these bounds are not realized, then the new system 
would have to regress to the appropriate TRL and be certified/verified to the predicted 
conditions of new mission.  
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 Since the Orange Star Mission characteristics (i.e., Environment, Application 
and Lifetime) are bounded within the Blue Round mission, the technology 
would be considered at TRL 6 or higher. 
 Scenario 2: The Grey Square Mission was successfully flown.  The Purple Triangle Mission 
wants to use the same technology. 
 
 Although the Application and expected Lifetime characteristics of the Purple 
Triangle Mission are bounded within the Gray Square Mission, the 
Environment is not.  Therefore, for the Purple Triangle Program, the 
technology would revert to the appropriate TRL. 
As shown in Table 2, although heritage is often taken to apply to any previous successful flight 
experience, in reality the environment, application, and lifetime of the heritage mission must be 
equivalent or exceed the mission severity under consideration (i.e., Table 2 TRL, Heritage and 
MEAL Example (b)).   
In the event that the application and lifetime are bounding, but the new mission is in a more 
severe environment, the assumed TRL is 4 because the technology has not been established at 
the prototype or breadboard/experimental level (i.e., Table 2 TRL, Heritage and MEAL Example 
(c)).   
If the environment and application are bounding, but the mission life is longer for the new 
mission, then the assumed TRL is 4 because while the technology is validated in principle, the 
success of the technology for the new cumulative stresses and failure probabilities have not 
been (This scenario is not included in Table 2).  
If the new application is more severe than that for the heritage mission, then the assumed TRL is 
3 because while the mission represents proof of concept, the technology requires validation for 
the intended application (i.e., Table 2 TRL, Heritage and MEAL Example (d)).   
If the environment, application, and mission life of the new mission exceed those of the heritage 
mission, then the assumed TRL is 1 (i.e., Table 2 TRL, Heritage and MEAL Example (e)).   
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Table 2. TRL, Heritage and MEAL Examples 
( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d ) ( e )
New 
Technology
Proposed New Mission MEAL (mission 
environment, application and expected 
lifetime) is equal or a subset of the 
previously flown mission MEAL, 
including identical concept, form fit, 
design,  interfaces, etc.
Proposed New Mission application and 
expected lifetime is equal or a subset 
of the previously flown mission, 
including identical concept, form fit, 
design,  interfaces, etc., but with an 
environment outside the previously 
flown mission.
Proposed New Mission MEAL  is equal 
or a subset of the previously flown 
mission MEAL, but with different 
application implementation (i.e. 
different design outside the previously 
flown like mechanical, thermal &/or 
electrical)
Design previously flown but different 
application, environment and lifetime 
(where the original application does 
not envelope the new application)
TRL # Description as stated  on  7120.5C
1 Basic principles observed and reported V&V Previous Data Available Previous Data Available Previous Data Available Previous Data Available
2
Technology concept and/or application 
formulated V&V Previous Data Available Previous Data Available Previous Data Available V&V
3
Analytical and experimental critical function 
and/or characteristic proof-of-concept V&V Previous Data Available Previous Data Available Previous Data Available V&V
4
Component and/or breadboard validation in 
laboratory environment V&V Previous Data Available Previous Data Available V&V V&V
5
Component and/or breadboard validation in 
relevant environment V&V Previous Data Available V&V V&V V&V
6
System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment V&V Previous Data Available V&V V&V V&V
7
System prototype demonstration in the real 
environment V&V V&V V&V V&V V&V
8
Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration V&V V&V V&V V&V V&V
9
Actual system "flight proven" through 






Must verify system/subsystem under 
relevant environment (acceptance 
verification test)
Must validate component &/or 
Breadboard under relevant 
environment.
Must validate component &/or 
Breadboard under laboratory 
environment.
Must be treated as the new technology
Notes:
V&V
Previous Data Available 
Mission Examples
 Description
Must be validated and verified as per TRL Definitions and descriptions.




























Environment Application Lifetime Environment Application Lifetime Environment Application LifetimeEnvironment Application Lifetime
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4.0 Verification Test and Inspection Matrix at Part-, Board- and Box-Level 
The purpose of verification is to show by analysis, demonstration, inspection, and/or test8 the 
satisfactory performance of hardware in the expected MEAL and that minimum workmanship 
standards have been met in accordance with the program risk posture.  
4.1 Verification Test/Inspection Purposes, Capabilities, Advantages, and Limitations 
The matrix in Appendix A lists common verification tests and inspections, along with the 
purpose of the procedures, capabilities, advantages, and limitations if performed at part-, board-, 
and box-level.  
 
1. “Purpose” is the reason(s) for which the given test or inspection is performed.  
2. “Capabilities” describe the ability of the test or inspection to address the elements listed 
under the purpose if performed at part-, board- and box-level, respectively.  
3. “Advantages” highlight additional tangible and/or intangible benefits of the given test or 
inspection.  
4. “Limitations” describe the shortcomings of the test or inspection to realize the elements of 
the purpose and any incurred risks associated with the execution of the test or inspection at a 
given level of testing.  
4.2 Verification Test/Inspection at Part-, Board-, Box/Subsystem- and System-Level 
 
 
The main threat the verification process seeks to avoid is a cluster of failures escaping prelaunch 
testing that disables a critical function before achieving mission objectives9. Non-random part 
failures correlated to a cause introduced by infant mortality and/or unexpected environmental 
impacts through workmanship or handling can introduce common cause failures and defeat 
redundancy. Redundancy is only effective when failure modes of the redundant components are 
not subject to failures due to a shared cause, known as common-cause failures (CCF). When 
redundant systems are alike, they will share the same flaws in design, manufacturing, and quality 
processes, inviting CCFs. Verification at various levels addresses the threats that can introduce 
CCFs and therefore removes some threats to mission success. The following sections provide an 
overview of verification testing at the various levels.  
4.2.1  Part-level Verification 
4.2.1.1 Introduction 
Even with modern mass production manufacturing processes, Weibull distribution and a bathtub 
curve apply when identifying part failure rates.  The bathtub curve plots the number of device 
                                                        
8 “Expanded Guidance for NASA Systems Engineering”, Volume 1: Systems Engineering Practices, March 2016, 
page 207. 
9 NESC-RP-12-00762, “Use of Commercial Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in NASA’s 
Commercial Crew Program (CCP)”, March 2012. 
Verification processes should show that the end product conforms to its specified 
requirements at all levels (i.e., part-, board-, box-level, subsystem-level, and system-
level).  
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failures in a production lot occurring over a period of time.  Initially, there will be a relatively 
high failure rate (i.e., infant mortality) due to manufacturing defects and non-compliant 
parts.  After a period of time, the failure rate drops to a low level and remains consistent for a 
long time (i.e., usable life regime).  Eventually, at the other end of the bathtub curve, the failure 
rate begins to increase as materials degrade (i.e., end-of-life wear-out regime).   
4.2.1.2 Parts Testing: Why and How 
Part-level testing is applied in two modes, screening and qualification, which ensure the flight 
parts from the testing are in the usable life regime.   
Screening tests are designed to apply an above normal amount of operating stresses on the parts, 
to accelerate the period where infant mortality occurs, and eliminate early failures from the 
lot.  It is expected there may be some failures during screening tests, but the surviving parts may 
be considered to be past the infant mortality stage and into the usable life to achieve the lowest 
failure rates during mission lifetime.  
Parts-level qualification testing is applied to a sample of parts from a production lot that has 
passed screening.  The goal of qualification is to simulate long-term operation through the usable 
life stage and ensure the parts will not reach the wear-out stage before the end of mission.  Many 
of the tests applied during qualification are similar to screening tests, but are applied at higher 
acceleration factors or for longer durations.  Although it is expected that samples from a “good” 
lot of parts will pass and be functional after qualification tests, the highly accelerated nature of 
the test consumes a significant portion of those samples usable life, and are generally considered 
unsuitable for flight.  Inspection type tests such as destructive physical analysis (DPA) can be 
used to compare pre- and post-qualification samples to identify degradation mechanisms in parts.  
The program/project should procure sufficient quantity of parts to meet its needs including 
spares even after attrition due to screening and provision of qualification samples. 
4.2.1.3 Screening for Part Infant Mortality and Other Defects 
It is important to note that both screening and qualification tests are much more useful when the 
applied stresses can be increased to achieve an acceleration factor.  Under these accelerated 
conditions, infant mortality failures may occur within 160 hours for example, whereas under 
normal operating conditions such as at the board- or box-level they may not occur until several 
months of operation or testing.  Part failures that occur during board- or box- testing can have 
much more drastic impacts than they would if removed during part-level screening.  Despite 
advances in manufacturing automation and mass production, defects still occur and the need to 
eliminate infant mortality remains. 
4.2.1.4 Major Advantages and Limitations of Part-level Verification 
Part-level testing is the lowest level of integration where part specifications and workmanship 
can be verified. Testing at the part level is the most effective method to identify part defects from 
manufacturing and, through screening test such as burn-in, to eliminate infant mortality failures 
and nonconforming parts from a lot. Part-level testing can be optimized to reveal particular 
failure mode(s) and has the distinct advantage of allowing the highest acceleration factors 
possible by tailoring the individual test conditions and stresses (e.g., electrical and 
environmental) to the limitations of each part. Accelerated test conditions allow for rapid testing 
and the high stress conditions necessary to force infant mortality failures during early 
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operation. Reduced stress diminishes the test’s ability to fully drive the infant mortals out of the 
population.  
Additionally, testing at the part-level offers the highest level of perceptibility to measure full 
electrical parameters to detect parametric shifts, which can indicate part degradation.  At higher 
levels of integration, many individual electrical parameters become masked by the overall 
system operation, and subtle shifts that are important may not be detected until they become so 
severe the system fails. Part-level testing also increases understanding of the individual part and 
provides insight into the possible failure mechanisms. For example, there is better understanding 
of the part’s construction quality and susceptibility to environmental conditions when performing 
part-level testing. Part-level testing increases understanding of the individual part and provides 
insight into the possible failure mechanisms. For example, there is better understanding of the 
parts construction quality and susceptibility to environmental conditions when performing part-
level testing.  Part-level testing also helps the designer understand the circuit design margins and 
allows “cherry pick” part to maximize performance and reliability.   
However, limitations exist.  Part-level testing may not verify interactions between parts on a 
board or in a system/subsystem, and involves more handling of parts, increasing the likelihood 
they will be damaged.  
4.2.2  Board-level Verification  
Board-level testing is the next lowest level of integration where the functional performance and 
the workmanship of a circuit (consisting of multiple parts) can be verified.  
Board-level testing can be useful for identifying part defects and infant mortality failures, but the 
capability and perceptivity is significantly reduced compared to part-level testing.  To avoid 
overstressing some parts on the board, environmental stresses need to be limited to the weakest 
or least capable part or material on the board, and knowing or finding the least capable part a 
priori may be difficult.  Additionally, electrical stresses placed on the individual parts within the 
board usually cannot be adjusted, and remain at nominal operation levels. This means the overall 
applied stress and life acceleration factor achieved is significantly less than would be possible at 
each individual part level.  The reduced acceleration factor requires a much longer duration test 
than would be required at the part level.  
As mentioned above, once integrated to the board-level, there is limited perceptivity to detect 
individual part electrical parameters and shifts, which could be indicators of degradation that 
could lead to a latent failure. Interactions between parts on the board can be verified, but one 
may not be able to identify a degraded or damaged part. Even if a part degrades to the point 
where its parametric values are outside of specifications, this could go undetected if the circuit 
continues to operate.  Continued degradation over time could introduce a latent circuit failure 
late in the verification process.  
Another significant disadvantage of moving testing to higher levels of integration is that a failure 
has increased consequences at this level.  At the board-level, the root cause of the failure must be 
determined, the failed parts must be removed from the board, replaced, and additional testing 
added to verify the new part performs as required at the board level, all of which augment risks 
to the rest of the board and may introduce schedule delays.  In addition, it is often difficult to 
determine whether a board/function failure is related to a part failure versus a design issue versus 
a board manufacturing issue. 
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Board-level testing does offer selected advantages.  Overall testing costs are typically reduced as 
compared to part level because multiple parts can be tested simultaneously.  Additionally, some 
complex or high-speed parts require significant biasing and support circuitry, and frequency-
tuned board characteristics to operate.  These conditions are often not feasible to implement with 
the temporary test fixturing and biasing available for part-level tests.  Board-level testing is often 
the only feasible option for parts such as radio frequency (RF) devices, high-speed analog 
devices, or complex microprocessors, and FPGAs.  An additional benefit of testing at the board-
level is that it tests the board assembly workmanship, mechanical and thermal design, and 
compatibility of materials chosen for assembly, such as solder, epoxy, staking, etc. 
4.2.3  Box-level or Subsystem-level Verification 
Box-level or subsystem-level testing is done to verify the functional performance and the 
workmanship of a box or subsystem consisting of multiple circuits. Boards’ interactions within 
the box can be verified and many box-level tests can be performed using consolidated 
autonomous test configurations.  
Compared to part- and board-level testing, box-level testing offers even lower perceptivity for 
detecting part defects and infant mortality, and it has the highest consequences if a failure is 
observed of any of the configurations considered in this paper.  At the box-level, low stress 
levels can be applied to the parts, both environmentally and electrically, to ensure the weakest 
parts are not overstressed.  Additionally, box-level testing requires larger and more expensive 
environmental chambers.   
Box-level testing offers the lowest ability to measure parameters for individual parts as test 
points and board traces become inaccessible for probing.  Parts failures discovered at box-level 
integration result in significant de-integration rework and retesting and this in turn results in 
significant risks and schedule delays.  Failures at box-level are also more difficult to diagnose.  
Was the failure caused by the part, the design, or workmanship?  Identifying root cause becomes 
more problematic.  Finally, circuit design margins cannot be determined due to the lack of access 
to test points to obtain part- and circuit-level timing and voltage measurements. 
4.2.4  System-level Verification 
The purpose of a full-system verification is to test and verify the entire payload under conditions 
that simulate the flight operations and environment as realistically as practical.  Appendix A 
focuses only at part-, board-, and box-level testing.  
4.2.5 Radiation Effects Verification 
Threats that the space radiation environment poses to semiconductor devices in space missions 
can be divided into two broad categories:   
1. Dose effects (i.e., TID and displacement damage dose (DDD)) result from cumulative 
exposure to the space radiation environment.  As such, they behave like wear-out effects 
with failure rate increasing as the dose increases.   
2. In contrast, single-event effects (SEE) are the parts’ prompt responses to the passage of a 
single ionizing particle through a volume in the part sensitive to that SEE mode.   
The following subsections describe common types of radiation testing applied to parts. 
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4.2.5.1 TID, DDD, and SEE 
Radiation tests for TID, DDD, and SEE are all at least potentially destructive.  Therefore, such 
testing is done during qualification testing on a sample of parts representative of the flight parts.  
For TID and DDD, this usually means the test parts must belong to the same wafer diffusion lot 
as the flight parts.  For SEE, lot-to-lot differences in performance are not usually as significant as 
those for TID or DDD.  As long as the test parts are fabricated in the same process and with the 
same mask set as the flight parts, the test is likely to be valid.  Note that in some cases, lot-to-lot 
and even part-to-part variation is significant for SEE and these situations require a greater level 
of fidelity between test and flight parts. 
Radiation testing for SEE has different goals than that for TID or DDD.  TID and DDD are 
cumulative effects, and failures are usually preceded by gradual parametric and functional 
degradation.  Thus, the goals of TID and DDD testing are to determine which parameters/ 
functions degrade and the part-to-part variation in that degradation at each dose step.  If parts are 
tested to failure (either parametric or functional), then the part-to-part variation in the failure 
dose is also of interest.  Mitigation of TID and DDD involves adding shielding or taking other 
steps (e.g., selecting operating conditions) to ensure that the dose on the part remains low enough 
where the probability of failure or degradation affecting the part’s ability meet requirements is 
negligible.   
In contrast, SEE can occur at any time in the device with equal probability (per ion).  As such, 
the primary goal of SEE testing is to identify all the SEE modes to which the part may be 
susceptible.  Thus, independent of whether the radiation environment is severe or benign, the test 
will irradiate the part to ion fluences much higher than will be seen during the mission.  SEE test 
methods are specifically tailored to include conditions where a given SEE mode is likely to occur 
if the device under test is susceptible.   For example, if the device under test includes CMOS 
(which can be susceptible to single event latch-up — SEL), some test runs will be performed 
with high fluences (i.e., greater than 107 ions per cm2) of highly ionizing (i.e., high-linear energy 
transfer (LET)) ions. These runs would be performed with the worst-case conditions for causing 
SEL in the DUT. Once this susceptibility is detected, then it is measured for a variety of ion 
species, energies, LETs, and angles of incidence.  These data are used to estimate the probability 
of each SEE mode occurring in the mission radiation environment.   
4.2.5.2 Radiation Testing at Different Configuration Levels 
Whether parts are tested at the part-, board-, or box-level affects the extent to which the goals 
outlined in the previous section can be met by testing.  First, board- and box-level studies are 
often performed with a single sample of the board or box.  This makes it impossible to assess 
how part-to-part variation would affect flight board/box performance unless there is high 
confidence part-to-part variation is negligible for all parts on the board.  Even if multiple test 
units are irradiated, the interactions between parts with different variability on the boards makes 
it difficult to interpret the results and bound flight unit performance. 
Radiation at higher-level assemblies also precludes optimizing the test to detect particular 
susceptibilities in any given technology. Moreover, parts on a board may only be susceptible to 
some failures for a fraction of the boards’ operating conditions. For example, if any part on a test 
board is bipolar, it is potentially susceptible to enhanced low dose rate sensitivity, in which parts 
degrade more severely at low dose rates (e.g., in space) than at high dose rates (e.g., in an 
accelerated TID test).  This means that the entire test must be conducted at a low dose rate.  
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Similarly, increasing board temperature and voltage may not be possible, and SEL testing would 
likely have to be done for realistic missions rather than bounding conditions. Test conditions and 
levels will be driven by the weakest parts in the test unit rather than by the level of hardness 
designers desire for the system.  
Nondestructive SEE modes and parametric degradation may also remain hidden in tests at the 
board- and box-level.  While it can be argued that such modes are not significant at the system 
level, they could have consequences if the hardware is in another logical or operating state when 
they occur.  In general, the more complicated the test unit (be it a part or a system), the less 
likely it is that the tester will be able to cover the full state space of operations in an accelerated 
test.   
Not every radiation tests can be performed at all integration levels. TID tests with gamma rays 
could be performed even for complex boxes as long as the beam is large enough to expose the 
entire test unit.  X-rays have less penetrating power than gamma rays, but are similarly suitable 
for part-, board- and box-level testing as long as the penetrating range of the radiation is much 
longer than the system size. A concern for multi-board systems is that a gamma ray or X-ray 
beam can be degraded as it passes through the forward boards, resulting in higher doses for the 
rear boards than the forward boards. Proton TID, DDD, and SEE tests can also be performed on 
integrated systems although the range of the protons must be considered (the range of a 200-
MeV is about 13.7 cm in Si).   
Heavy-ion SEE testing at levels of integration higher than the part-level is problematic. 
Preparing parts on the board to ensure ions from conventional accelerators reach device sensitive 
volumes can compromise their structural integrity, making them unreliable and vulnerable to 
mechanical failures. In principle, a sufficiently broad, high-energy heavy-ion beam (e.g., like that 
at the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL)) could effectively test parts at the board-level 
without modification, albeit with significant amounts of analysis required to account for beam 
degradation as it traverses various parts.  However, heavy-ion SEE testing at the multi-board or 
box-level is generally not feasible due to limited penetration ranges of the ions and the difficulty 
of modeling transport of the ions through complicated structures in the test unit.   
Board- and box-level tests must be designed around the limitations of the weakest part(s) in the 
system, which creates challenges for radiation testing.  This is especially true for board-level 
SEE tests, which are usually performed with high-energy protons due to their greater penetrating 
range, eliminating the difficulties with board preparation for heavy ion tests. Such a proton test 
cannot detect SEE modes caused only by moderately to highly ionizing particles (Z>14).  
However, even for low LET modes, only 1 of ~289000 protons creates a recoil ion (i.e., the 
secondary particle capable of causing the SEE) while every proton contributes to TID. To avoid 
board- or box-level failures due to TID-susceptible parts, the test will often need to be restricted 
to a low proton fluence (e.g., 1010 to 1011 cm-2).  Such low-fluence tests usually fail to reveal all, 
or even representative sample, of the SEE susceptibilities in the system under test and on-orbit 
experience can differ dramatically from the test results, as seen in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Simulated strikes of ions (red dots) overlaid on a photomicrograph 60 x 70 µm2 section of 
an Elpida 512 Mbit SDRAM. Left: Recoil Ions due to 1010 Protons/cm2. Right: 107 ions/cm2 typical 
of heavy ion SEE test. 
Often, the softest parts to TID in the test unit that drive the low fluence requirements are linear 
bipolar components fabricated in large-dimension, older technologies.  These simple parts do not 
usually require high ion fluences to characterize their SEE response.  In contrast, complex parts 
that require high fluences for SEE characterization are fabricated in more advanced 
microelectronic technologies that are much more tolerant to TID and remain functional at the 
high proton fluences required to provide adequate coverage of SEE modes.   
In general, the fluence required to adequately test a device scales with its complexity and the 
transistor count is often a good guide to device complexity. Transistor count scales roughly as 
the inverse square of the minimum feature size of the technology, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Transistor Count Scales Roughly as the Inverse Square of the Minimum Feature Size of 
the Technology 
However, there are other factors to consider (e.g., number of functions or operating modes).  A 
quad core processor with a given transistor count is likely less complicated than a single 
processor with the same transistor count.  Similarly, a static random access memory (SRAM) 
may be fabricated in an advanced CMOS process with high transistor density, but its architecture 
will be highly repetitive and, as such, it will not require as high a fluence to characterize its SEE 
response as would a less repetitive part with similar transistor count.  In contrast, although the 
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memory array of a synchronous dynamic random-access memory (SDRAM) is highly repetitive, 
the part exhibits complex SEE behavior as a result of upsets in its control logic. 
Even if the testing is performed with ultra-high-energy heavy ions rather than protons, 
differential performance in the parts on the board (box-level testing is not possible with heavy 
ions currently available at any accelerator) can still complicate the task of thoroughly 
characterizing the board.  If one or more of the components on the board is susceptible to 
destructive or highly disruptive SEE modes, it may prevent the test from accumulating sufficient 
fluence or probing all of the full state space of the test unit.   
4.2.6  Potential Consequences of Skipping Part-level Testing 
At board- or box-level or higher integration levels (e.g., subsystems and system levels), the 
capability to identify counterfeit parts, infant mortals, and other defects is diminished allowing 
such problem parts to manifest at higher levels of assembly and integration.  Furthermore, if 
there is significant variability in degradation or failure distributions of parts in the test unit, then 
flight units may be susceptible to failure modes not revealed during testing at a higher level of 
integration.  In this case, the only way to detect and mitigate the risk is to test at the part level 
and fully understand the MEAL. 
 
4.2.7  Thermal Impact on Part-, Board- and Box-level Verification - an Example  
Thermal tests (e.g., thermal cycling, thermal vacuum, extreme temperature, etc.) are generally 
performed for four reasons: 
 
1. To ensure performance and margin of the device under extreme temperature environment 
(i.e., hot and cold).  
2. To weed out infant mortality and other defects (e.g., manufacturing, handling, etc.) 
3. To ensure performance and margin of the integrated system under extreme temperature 
environment (i.e., hot and cold) 
4. To weed out workmanship related defects at the assembly level. 
Items 1 and 2 are best answered using parts-level testing, and items 3 and 4 relate to board- or 
box-level testing. Depending on the complexity of the design, some engineers/managers may opt 
to do thermal tests at higher system integration levels (i.e., board and/or box) to avoid the cost 
and schedule impact of bounding risk due to items 1 and 2. Moreover, they may take the action 
without understanding the stress levels imposed and the risk such an omission carries for not 
detecting a latent defect.   
The following examples illustrate the temperature profiles of two independent board assemblies 
and the effect when attempting to use the board- and box-level thermal test to weed out part 
Skipping part-level testing is often done to reduce the cost and schedule of testing.  
However, cost savings will be realized only if no failures are detected during testing at the 
higher integration level, assuming this higher integration level testing is sufficient to catch 
individual parts that could fail during a mission. If there were any failures detected at a 
higher level, then it would have a negative impact on cost and schedule.  Moreover, 
testing at higher integration levels reduces knowledge of design margin and margin to 
failures. Vulnerabilities not detected during verification process may lead to adverse 
consequences ranging from degraded performance to LOM or LOC. 
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infant mortality. For a simple comparison, the team considered only the thermal acceleration 
factor, which is based on the difference between the nominal operating temperature and the 
maximum allowed operating temperature. Acceleration means that operating a unit at higher 
stress (i.e., higher temperature, voltage, humidity, or duty cycle, etc.) produces the same failures 
that would occur at lower stresses except that they happen much quicker. An acceleration factor 
is the constant multiplier between the two stress levels10. 
Example 1: Single-Board Testing 
 Single board #1 operating at room temperature 
    
Figure 6.  Left: Image of Board #1. Right: Thermal Image of the Powered Board #1 
As shown in Figure 6, while board #1 is powered ON at room temperature (22.6oC), it exhibits a 
thermal profile with a delta of approximately 40oC, from the coldest to the hottest part(s) on the 
board (76oC). It should be noted the test was done in air and thus there is additional thermal 
convection with the air, not available in space vacuum. (Typically, for exact temperatures of the 
board components it is recommended to add external temperature sensors on selected areas since 
the temperatures you observe using the IR camera depend on the infrared emissivity of what you 
are looking at.  So “shiny metal” parts will tend to have low infrared emissivity while the casings 
of other components will likely have much higher emissivity.  So caution must be exercised 
when basing temperatures on the infrared image.) 
For illustration and comparison purpose, the team considered the case surface temperature of 
125oC would bring the junction temperature of the components to their maximum allowed level. 
Depending on the device, this surface temperature may vary. For example, to raise the hottest 
part(s) temperature to a target accelerated test temperature of 125oC (case surface temperature),  
the ambient temperature on the board has to be increased from 22.6oC to 71.6oC, or a delta of 
49oC, as shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7.  Board #1 Estimated Temperature Profile with Ambient Temperature of 71.6ºC 
                                                        
10 8.1.4 What is “physical acceleration” and how do we model it? 
http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/apr/section1/apr14.htm 
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The maximum ambient temperature of board #1 is limited by the hottest part(s) on the board, 
which is assumed at 125oC.  It is important the designer remember the maximum allowed 
operating temperatures of all parts within the design and ensure that these limits are not 
exceeded.  Some designs contain parts with different technologies, each with potentially different 
maximum operating temperatures. These combinations may further limit the maximum allowed 
operating temperature of the board and/or box, with the limiting operating temperature 
depending not just on the design, but also on the part(s) with the lowest allowed maximum 
operating temperature. The fact that many parts will not be tested at their maximum temperature 
rating shows why part-level testing is important to address the first two of the four reasons 
above.  
 Single board #2 operating at room temperature 
    
Figure 8.  Left: Image of Board #2; Right: Thermal Image of Powered Board #2 
Similarly, as shown in Figure 8, while board #2 is powered ON at room temperature, it exhibits a 
thermal profile with a delta of approximately 20oC from the coldest to the hottest part(s) on the 
board.  Similarly to board #1, Figure 9 shows that to raise the board hottest part(s) temperature to 
125oC, the ambient temperature has to increase from 28.3oC to 103.5oC or a delta of 75.2oC. 
 
Figure 9.  Board #2 estimated Temperature Profile with Ambient Temperature of 103.5oC 
Again, the maximum ambient temperature of board #2 is limited by the hottest part(s) on the 
board, assumed to be 125oC. It is important the designer remember the maximum allowed 
operating temperatures of all parts within the design and ensure that under no circumstances 
these limits would be exceeded as discussed. 
Example 2: Box-level testing with boards #1 and #2. 
At box-level, when combining board #1 and board #2 in the same box, raising the ambient 
temperature to achieve maximum temperature of the parts within the board assemblies, would be 
limited to the first part that reaches the 125oC. Furthermore, it is understood that testing at the 
box level can introduce thermal interactions between multiple boards, which can include thermal 
radiation, reduction or elimination of buoyancy driven convection (when tested in a gaseous 
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environment), and conduction depending on the internal physical configuration and the external 
thermal interfaces.  
Although board-to-board interactions complicate determination of parts temperatures this does 
not affect the conclusion that while some parts have reached their maximum temperature others 
would remain much cooler. For simplicity, we neglected board-to-board interactions, since they 
do not alter the limitations imposed by testing at box or higher levels of integration.  
Based on the above, and assuming both boards share the same ambient temperature, board #1 
would reach the 125oC in some of its parts at an ambient temperature of 71.6oC, but board #2 
maximum temperature would be 93.1oC, as shown Figure 10. 
   
Figure 10.  Estimated Maximum Boards #1 and 2 Temperature Profile when Tested at the Box-l 
Level.  Notice that the ambient temperature is shared by both boards. 
The power dissipation of the board varies with respect to the circuit design and the individual 
parts. This implies that the operating temperature of the board and individual parts are not evenly 
distributed as seen on the board and box examples thermal images.  
Table 3 compares the acceleration factors between single-board and box-level thermal tests. It 
shows the maximum and minimum achieved thermal acceleration factor for each test 
configuration, assuming an activation energy of 0.7eV, as shown in the last column in Table 3. 
Different failure mechanisms have different activation energy and therefore the acceleration 
factors are different for different failure mechanisms. Table 3 highlights the limitation of the 
achievable thermal acceleration factor at board- and box-level compared to part-level using the 
activation energy of 0.7eV as an example. Using a different activation energy will change the 
thermal acceleration factor values, but the observation shown in the Table 3 will remain the 
same.   
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Table 3. Comparison of Acceleration Factors between Single-board and Box-level Thermal Tests 
 
For example, assume that the boxes in the example are tested for 168-hour at their maximum 
allowed temperature based on their respective hottest part(s).  Table 4 calculates the equivalent 
times corresponding to a 168-hour burn-in test on the hottest and coldest part(s) on these boards 
and boxes assuming 0.7eV activation energy.  The equivalent times are roughly an order of 
magnitude different so that the hottest and coldest part(s) could be on different regimes of the 
bathtub curve shown notionally in Figure 11.  The top two plots are for boards #1 and #2, while 
the bottom plots for the box with boards #1 and #2.  With the same amount of testing duration, 
the left plots show that parts could be potentially in infant mortal and constant failure rate 
regimes while the right plots show that hottest parts could be in wear-out regime if additional test 
hours were performed.  
Table 4. Comparison of Equivalent Time Corresponding to 168 Hour Burn-in Test on the Hottest 











(coldest part & ambient 
temperature)
Max Min T1 Ea
1 76 22.6 34 0.5 30 0.7
2 49.8 28.3 5 0.9 30 0.7
1 125 71.6 601 25 30 0.7
2 125 103.5 601 188 30 0.7
1 125 71.6 601 25 30 0.7
2 93.1 71.6 102 25 30 0.7




Box Level board temperatures at elevated ambient 
(i.e. two boards together; limited by hottest part)




Individual Board temperatures at ambient  (actual)
Individual Board temperatures estimates at elevated 
ambient (limited by hottest part)
1
2
1 168 11.5 0.5 3971.3 272.7 11.5
2 168 11.5 3.6 538.9 37.0 11.5
1 168 11.5 0.5 3971.3 272.7 11.5




Individual Board temperatures at ambient  (actual)
Individual Board temperatures estimates at elevated 
ambient (limited by hottest part)
Box Level board temperatures at elevated ambient 






Equivalent BI Accelerated time (yrs) Equivalent BI Accelerated time (yrs)













Table 3 shows that, in general, the higher the integration, the lower the acceleration 
factor.  If tested at the part-level, then each individual part could be stressed at the 
maximum temperature to achieve the largest possible acceleration factor. 
The large difference of the thermal acceleration shown in Table 3 means parts on the 
boards and boxes are consuming dramatically different lengths of their useful lifetime 
when they are subjected to board- or box-level testing.  This could lead to parts operating 
in the different regimes on the bathtub curve and some parts may be operating with 
failure rates higher than their optimal values due to their infant mortality or wear-out. 
The examples shown consider only thermal acceleration factor with a single activation 
energy. Reality is more complex, with electrical bias differences as well as various failure 
mechanisms and their interactions also contributing to overall failure rates. 
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Figure 11.  Notional Bathtub Reliability Curve 
5.0 Verification of COTS Part, Board, and/or Box 
The MEAL and risk posture based verification process applies to any avionics technology 
system verification, including COTS part-, board-, and box- technology and previously flown 
technology.  
5.1 Background of COTS Use in Spaceflight Programs 
As demands for improved performance in spaceflight programs increase, and budget and 
schedule pressures remain constrained, the temptation has increased to implement new or 
previously flown avionics technologies, including COTS technologies, into human-rated and 
robotic spaceflight programs.  
It is likely that the pressures will increase as the differential performance (e.g., speed, density, 
power, etc.) between CMOS (complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor) COTS parts and 
radiation-hardened parts continues to expand, shown in Figure 12.   
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Figure 12.  Comparison between Commercial and Radiation-Hardened CMOS Technologies11 
As shown in Figure 12, evolution of both COTS CMOS and radiation hardened CMOS show 
exponential trends with time (R2>0.98 for an exponential fit - dotted lines - to both series).  
However, commercial CMOS doubles in density roughly every 18 months while radiation 
hardened CMOS doubles in density every 24 months.  This means that radiation-hardened 
CMOS performance lags even further behind commercial technology, dropping another 
generation behind roughly every decade. 
While state-of-the-art COTS parts can increase system performance and capabilities, they also 
can dramatically increase system complexity to the point where characterization of the part, let 
alone the system, for all logical and operating states become practically impossible. The system 
state space complexity increases exponentially with the part complexity, and access to 
information about individual part performance and margins to failure decreases.  This makes full 
characterization for board- or box-level testing with complex parts a daunting problem.  
Commercial parts pose significant challenges when it comes to ensuring test parts are 
representative of flight parts and for commercial boards and boxes/systems, the challenges are 
even greater. Commercial parts have limited manufacturing traceability. This makes the task of 
ensuring part performance over time and purchase lots complicated since processes, packaging, 
and part technology may change with little or no warning to the end users.  For commercial 
boards and boxes/systems, there is no guarantee that vendors are even using the same parts from 
one board to the next.  As long as the boards yield similar performance in their intended 
(terrestrial) environment and meet the vendor’s specifications, vendors can use any parts they 
wish.  Inferring behavior of flight systems from test systems without a thorough understanding of 
                                                        
11 S. P. Brown, et al, “How Moor’s Law is Enabling a New Generation of Telecommunications Payloads”, AIAA SPACE 
Forum, 32nd AIAA International Communications Satellite Systems Conference, August 4-7, 2014. 
Rad hard parts lags commercial CMOS parts by 
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the vendor’s configuration controls is likely to be an exercise in futility as well as a significant 
source of risk to mission success. 
Spaceflight programs are incentivized to use COTS avionics technologies to reduce design, 
development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) costs, to meet programmatic schedules, and increase 
system performance. However, in some cases, COTS technologies that have not been fully vetted 
according to procedures appropriate for operation in a space environment, or for their intended 
application, environment and lifecycle have been inserted into space hardware, introducing risks 
to the spaceflight systems. Meanwhile, the continued pressure to minimize DDT&E costs and the 
trend toward more complex spaceflight mission designs and interfaces (i.e., advanced 
architectures and more complicated parts), the potential for increased/unrecognized risk 
increases.    
5.2 Verification Process for COTS Technology 
The Aerospace Corporation reviewed several dozen missions and found evidence12  a “No Fly” 
zone, characterized by increased failure rates, exists when pressures to reduce DDT&E cost and 
programmatic schedule meet increased system complexity, as shown in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13.  Evidence of "No Fly" Zone13. 
The Aerospace team developed a “complexity index” based on considerations of mission 
characteristics, spacecraft size, power consumption, number of payloads, GN&C demands and 
data processing and throughput.  This normalized index correlated with mission success and 
failure, giving strong indications of a no-fly zone where complexity drove mission cost and 
schedule and where attempts to drive down these constraints tended to lead to mission failures14. 
Limited understanding of COTS technology and how they perform in the mission environment 
over the design lifetime may lead to incomplete verification processes. For example, designers 
may improperly contend that because a part-, board-, or box- technology had flown in a 
spaceflight application, it has proven heritage and does not need to be requalified. Alternatively, 
designers may incorrectly argue that because the technology is an automotive COTS part, it is 
                                                        
12 William F. Tosney, “What the U.S. Space Industry Learned the ‘Hard Way’ and Why it’s ‘Back to Basics” (ppt charts) 
13 William F. Tosney, “What the U.S. Space Industry Learned the ‘Hard Way’ and Why it’s ‘Back to Basics” (ppt charts) 
14 D. Bearden, “Complexity based risk assessment of low cost planetary missions: when is the mission too fast and too cheap”, 
presented at 4th IAA International Conference on Low Cost Planetary Missions, JHU/APL, Laurel, MD, May 2-5, 2000. 
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more reliable than a non-automotive COTS parts. These assertions could lead programs to select 
incomplete verification process and a false sense of security.  
NASA has successfully used COTS parts in mission critical applications throughout the 
Agency’s history.  This has been achieved by careful selection, qualification, and screening of 
the parts to meet the missions’ requirements.  The level of part verification required to assure 
they will work successfully is highly dependent on the mission, environment, application, and 
lifetime (MEAL), the avionics architecture, and the part technology15.  
 
6.0 Example Lessons Learned for Verification Based on MEAL and Risk 
Posture 
In this section, a number of examples and/or lessons learned are provided, including heritage 
misapplication, part level, and radiation verification.   
6.1  Heritage Misapplication Examples 
Example 1: Genesis Spacecraft Crash (ref. Genesis Mishap Report, November 30, 2005) 
Genesis was one of NASA’s Discovery missions and its purpose was to collect samples of solar 
wind and return them to Earth. Launched on August 8, 2001, Genesis was to provide 
fundamental data to help scientists understand the formation of the solar system. On September 
8, 2004, the Genesis sample return capsule drogue parachute did not deploy during entry, 
descent, and landing operations over the Utah Test and Training Range. After the point of 
expected drogue deployment, the sample return capsule began to tumble and crashed on the Test 
Range at 9:58:52 MDT. On September 10, 2004, the Associate Administrator for the Science 
Mission Directorate established a Type-A MIB as defined by NASA Procedural Requirements 
                                                        
15 NESC-RP-13-00850, Implementation Case Study of Electronic Components in Safety-Critical Avionics Systems, 
June 2014. 
The MEAL and risk posture based verification process applies to any avionics technology 
system verification, including COTS part-, board-, and box- technology and previously 
flown technology. 
There is no “one size fits all” solution for the selection and verification of the avionics 
system and technology, including architecture and parts assurance requirements, to ensure 
safety and mission success. Understanding MEAL and risks, as well as adopting an 
attitude of “trust but verify”, is critical. 
The understanding of the MEAL requires a complete synchronous picture of how avionics 
and parts technologies are to be used effectively.  The considerations summarized in the 
MEAL allow designers to effectively choose parts for their best performance in a given 
architecture.  Emphasizing one of the MEAL elements without understanding the others 
can compromise the integrity and performance of the parts and the mission success.  
The MEAL suggests appropriate strategies for mission design, development, 
implementation, and defines end-of-mission conditions. It also informs/bounds the 
verification approach and processes through all stages. The selected verification processes 
must ensure the adequacy of the design is commensurate with the risk that is acceptable to 
the project. 
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8621.1A, “NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap Reporting, Investigating, and 
Recordkeeping”, to determine the cause and potential lessons from the incident. The Mishap 
Investigation Board determined the cause of the mishap to be that the G-switch sensors were in 
an inverted orientation, per an erroneous application implementation, and were unable to sense 
the return capsule deceleration during atmospheric entry and initiate parachute deployments. 
It is clear that the failure of the G-switch was not related to the lifetime or environment, but due 
to the application implementation of the G-switch.  The switch’s erroneous implementation 
pointed to the lack of comprehensive knowledge of the heritage application including 
verification, but most important the review teams failed to identify the design implementation 
error.  Furthermore, the verification process did not detect the design implementation error and 
the program red team review process did not uncover the failure of the verification process.  In 
addition, the MIB found inadequate project systems engineering management and processes.  
The MIB also highlighted the “unfounded Confidence in Heritage Designs” as a major 
contributor that resulted in the erroneous implementation (i.e., the inversion of the G-switch 
sensors and the failures to detect it). 
Example 2: Launch Pad 39A Flame Trench  
The KSC Launch Pad 39A was originally designed and built in the 1960s to support the Saturn V 
and Saturn 1B launches to the Moon and to the Skylab, respectively.  It was later used to support 
the Space Transportation System (STS) or the Space Shuttle Program (SSP).  Launch Pad 39A’s 
flame trench was originally designed to deflect/divert and protect the vehicle and launch pad 
structures from the exhaust heat and acoustic shock waves of the Saturn liquid oxygen/hydrogen 
fueled engines.  
The flame trench design (Figure 14)consisted of a concrete and refractory brick, wedge-type 
flame deflector similar to those used on KSC Launch Pads 34 and 37.  
 
Figure 14.  Launch Pad 39A Flame Deflector System 
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Example 2a: 
After the Apollo Program, the Launch Pad 39A underwent modifications to support the space 
shuttle launches. Although the acoustic shock waves from the liquid engines and solid rocket 
boosters (SRBs) were similar to the Saturn V launches, the risk on the Apollo spacecraft was 
less.  The space shuttle was about half the height of the Saturn V, resulting in the crew cabin and 
payload bay being much closer to the platform, and much more vulnerable to the acoustic 
energy. NASA’s predicted acoustic shock wave levels produced by the shuttle engines were 
underestimated, falling outside the expected environment and damaging many of the protective 
tiles on Columbia’s first shuttle launch (STS-1) (i.e., failure to properly assess the acoustic 
environment). To mitigate the acoustic environment, a water acoustic suppression system was 
installed on the mobile launch platform to dampen vibrations. The acoustical suppression system 
protected the orbiter and its payloads from being damaged by muffling acoustical energy that 
could crack and damage surfaces during liftoff. Water stored in a 300,000-gallon elevated tank 
was released just prior to main engine ignition and flowed to the launch platform outlets, 
flooding the launch area at the crucial moments surrounding ignition, and serving two purposes: 
keeping flames from spreading and preventing damage caused by sound waves.  
Example 2b: 
On May 31, 2008, during the launch of the space shuttle Discovery (STS-124), the KSC Launch 
Pad 39A flame trench suffered extensive damage. The propulsion system exhaust from 
Discovery’s liftoff breached the flame trench wall at the base of the pad allowing hot gases to 
penetrate the trench lining system. This affected a section of heat-resistant brick and concrete 
blocks about 75 feet by 20 feet in size (Figure 15, solid rocket booster (SRB) side), blasting over 
3,000 refractory bricks into and beyond the flame trench.  
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The Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) found the failure was the result of damage/weakening of 
the refractory brick epoxy bonding by carbonation and corrosion of steel anchors, which held the 
refractory bricks in the trench in place. The SRB exhaust by-products (i.e., AlCl3 and HCl), the 
SRB ignition over-pressure and acoustics, as well as the aging of the system (i.e., failure to 
identify and consider Environment and Lifetime exposure to those conditions) exacerbated the 
brick bonding and anchor corrosion. 
These examples illustrate what could happen when using heritage hardware or design without a 
clear understanding of their original intended MEAL, thereby by failing to properly assess the 
suitability of the heritage design for the new intended mission. 
6.2 Part-level Verification: Enabling Identification of Part Infant Mortality Defects and 
Failures 
Part-, board-, and box-level testing have distinct advantages in certain areas. All have continued 
to prove to be valuable tests for flight missions. Many defects or issues are captured during part-
level testing. However, some are only discovered at the higher levels of integration (e.g., board- 
or box-level testing).  The following examples illustrate the importance of appropriate testing at 
multiple levels of integration.  
1. During the Express Logistics Carrier (ELC) Project, a part radiation susceptibility issue was 
discovered during part-level total ionizing dose (TID) testing. A COTS metal-oxide-
semiconductor field-effect transistor (MOSFET) APT50M38 was tested for TID. Although 
the MOSFETs passed screening tests, TID testing required screened samples and therefore 
had to wait until screening was completed. The TID test found that the parts failed at low 
doses and were unsuitable for flight. By the time the TID was completed, the boards were 
already assembled and being tested. The part had to be replaced with a parallel configuration 
of radiation hardened power MOSFETs, but the “RDSon” (on resistance between source and 
drain of the power MOSFET) increased, reducing the efficiency.  This incurred redesign 
effort, and posed challenges with regard to fitting the new configuration within the envelope 
of the original parts.  The benefit associated with the redesign, although costly, far 
outweighed the consequences of a part failure if the TID test had not been performed.  
Failure to do TID testing at part-level resulted in a lengthy and difficult redesign, and it was 
fortunate that the parallel MOSFET solution fit the same footprint as the original device. The 
issue is the programmatic decision to assembly at risk while waiting for an expected positive 
TID testing result.  If the serial testing had been completed before board were populated, the 
consequences would have been different. 
2. The ELC Project experienced another anomaly with a part that was not observed until full 
system-level integration.  It was discovered that a polarized capacitor was inadvertently 
installed onto the flight boards with reverse polarity.  This reverse bias operation was slowly 
damaging the capacitor, especially under heavy power loading conditions.  However, due to 
the slow rate of damage, the part failure was not observed during board- or box-level testing.  
This was realized after launch by operational testing of the ground unit, which was identical 
to the flight unit.  Operational parameters of the mission had to be adjusted to minimize 
stress to those components. Space Technology 5 (ST-5) experienced a similar failure, which 
was discovered during the board-level testing. 
3. The Swift spacecraft’s Burst Alert Telescope (BAT) provides examples of part anomalies 
discovered during various levels of integration testing. One example was related to the 
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power-up sequencing of an FPGA. Such problems often cannot be discovered during part-
level testing, because they depend on the interaction of multiple parts within the circuit and 
flight-like impedance characteristics. In this instance, the board failed to start up in the proper 
configuration during board-level testing. The root cause was incorrectly attributed to the 
ground support equipment harnessing used to perform the board test, with the assumption 
that the final flight harnessing would have better impedance matches, resolving the issue.  
The startup configuration issue proceeded through board- and box-level testing. At final 
system-level testing, with the flight harness installed, the issue persisted and it was realized 
that the root cause was the power-up sequencing programmed into the FPGA, which was 
corrected to resolve the issue. Similar power-up sequencing issues led to a complete failure 
of the Wide-Field Infrared Explorer mission.   
4. Swift/BAT instrument encountered radiation susceptibilities during single-event burnout 
(SEB) testing. After part-level screening, a COTS MOSFET IRF640 was tested for SEB and 
discovered to be susceptible to burnout at 22% of its rated voltage. Since this was discovered 
early in the project, the part was designed out and replaced with a radiation hard MOSFET.  
Additionally, an operational amplifier, OP296, was found to have low TID susceptibility, 
failing parametrically at less than 1 krad (Si) and functionally at less than 2 krad (Si). This 
susceptibility was confirmed with board-level testing.  Under exposure to radiation, the 
overall board performance was observed to degrade until it failed to meet specifications. The 
part was designed out and replaced with a TID tolerant Op-Amp. 
5. Swift/BAT instrument experienced several anomalies relating to the AD590 temperature 
sensors used on loop heat pipes.  These COTS style sensors made it through parts-level 
testing successfully with a typical infant mortality fallout rate.  However, once parts were 
integrated at the subsystem level, a handling issue occurred where an operator failed to wear 
electrostatic discharge (ESD) protection when working near the temperature sensors. As a 
result, several of the sensors failed at the subsystem level and had to be replaced. Only the 
sensors that had failed were replaced even though all of the sensors had been potentially 
exposed to ESD.  The event was documented and carried as a programmatic residual risk.  
The remaining sensors on the loop heat pipe survived subsystem-level testing until a latent 
failure occurred during spacecraft level testing.  At this point, all accessible temperature 
sensors were removed and replaced.  Failure analysis and DPA of the removed sensors 
showed ESD damage.  Unfortunately, not all sensors were accessible at this stage of 
integration and some could not be replaced.  The project was forced to carry the risk of latent 
failure on those replaced sensors into launch and operation. During flight operation, the 
affected loop heat pipe system failed and the root cause was attributed to the suspect sensors 
that were not replaced. 
6. The Neutron star, Interior Composition Explorer, experienced an infant mortality part failure 
during board-level screening.  Due to its class D mission classification, short lifetime, and 
redundant detector systems, the project was able to justify board-level screening tests over 
parts-level tests. During the board-level burn-in testing, an infant mortality failure of a 
ceramic capacitor was discovered. The failed capacitor had received some initial part-level 
burn-in screening. However, the testing was not stressful enough to induce the infant 
mortality failures. Failure analysis and cross-sectioning were performed and the failure site 
was identified. Root cause was established as a void in the dielectric during manufacturing, 
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which allowed electro-migration of electrode metal into the void, causing a resistive short 
across the capacitor. 
7. Increased leakage current in a ceramic capacitor is a potential sign of pending failure. Even 
microamp increases in leakage current could indicate a part defect that will degrade into a 
dead short. These parameters would be observed during part-level testing and the defective 
parts would be removed from the lot.  However, at the board- or box-level, microamp 
increases in current draw would likely never be observed until the part exhibits high leakage 
current/lower insulation resistance or a dead-short failure. 
8. NESC performed DPA, environmental stress testing, and radiation testing on some selected 
automotive and non-automotive COTS parts.  The environmental stress testing regimen was 
a partial set of the qualification criteria contained in the Automotive Executive Council 
(AEC) Qualification test standards, AEC Q100, Q101, and Q200, as applicable. Seven part 
types (i.e., six automotive and one non-automotive) were subjected to reflow simulation, 
highly accelerated stress testing, life testing, and thermal cycling. Electrical measurements 
made after each test identified two part types (i.e., one automotive and one non-automotive 
part) that did not meet datasheet parameters. Six additional COTS parts (i.e., three 
automotive and three non-automotive) were subjected to thermal cycling of 1000 cycles, with 
pre- and post-electrical test measurements and DPA. While all six part types passed electrical 
test measurements after thermal cycling, one non-automotive part type exhibited rejectable 
physical degradation in DPA. The defects and failures seen in this limited evaluation for the 
automotive and non-automotive COTS parts during environmental stress testing were higher 
than expected. 
6.3 Challenges of Radiation Testing on COTS Parts: Part-to-Part SEE Variability for 
Some COTS Parts  
COTS parts may exhibit higher part-to-part variability in their radiation responses than 
traditional space-qualified parts.  Since existing military standards and industrial standards either 
do not have sample size recommendations or use small quantities (e.g., three or five samples in 
testing, the small sample size may be inadequate when evaluating commercial parts. An example 
of this is documented in a 2016 study on commercial power MOSFET SEE response16.  
The 2016 study discusses heavy ion SEE testing on five different part types of next generation, 
commercial trench power MOSFETs with sample size greater than 50 per part type. Some 
MOSFETs showed large part-to-part variation in onset voltage for SEB. This suggests that SEE 
testing of commercial power MOSFETs using a small test sample size may fail to consistently 
capture the full extent of part-to-part variability. This could have serious consequences for space 
qualification if a small sample test is widely leveraged, especially where a SEB mechanism is 
dominant.  The results show that part-to-part variation may challenge traditional MOSFET SEE 
qualification methods, which are typically done with small sample sizes. It may not be feasible to 
use 50+ sample size in most tests, but even an expansion from small samples (3 to 6 parts) to 
moderately large samples (10 to 20 parts) significantly improves assessment of sample variation.  
The study also showed that burn-in greatly reduced the part-to-part variability in one power 
MOSFET type. Therefore, SEE testing performed on non-burned-in power MOSFETs may yield 
                                                        
16 J.S. George, et al, “Response Variability in Commercial MOSFTEs SEE Qualification”, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear 
Science, Vol. 64, NO.1, January 2017. 
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an incorrect safe operating area because the test parts distribution is not representative of the 
screened flight parts.  In the study, a three-sample test of non-burned-in power MOSFET devices 
risks overestimating robustness since 78% of the non-burned-in devices exceeded the mean of 
the burned-in sample set. This means it would produce an artificially large safe operating area).  
7.0 Definitions 
The following definitions are from NESC-RP- 12-00759 Version: 1.2 “Use of Commercial–Off-
The-Shelf (COTS) Electronic Components in Safety- Critical Human-Rated (Commercial Crew) 
Space Avionics Systems.” 
Board/Assembly/System Qualification: Tests intended to demonstrate the test item will 
function within performance specifications under simulated conditions demonstrating margin to 
the environments bounding those expected from ground handling, launch, and flight operations.  
Their purpose is to uncover deficiencies in design and method of manufacture. They are not 
intended to exceed design safety margins or to introduce unrealistic modes of failure. The design 
qualification tests may be to either “prototype” or “proto-flight” test levels. These tests are 
performed at levels well below those at the EEE piece parts level.  
COTS: An assembly or part designed for commercial applications for which the item 
manufacturer or vendor solely establishes and controls the specifications for performance, 
configuration and reliability, including design, materials, processes, and testing without 
additional requirements imposed by users and external organizations.  For example, this would 
include any type of assembly or part from a catalog without any additional parts level testing 
after delivery of the part from the manufacturer.  
DPA: Destructive Physical Analysis, a sample test, based on GSFC S-311-M-70 and MIL-STD-
1580.  DPA is an independent (not performed by manufacturer/supplier) assessment of the lot 
quality proposed for flight use.  Deconstruction of the part may identify part issues or possible 
failure modes not visible externally, or by electrical inspection. Some of these “invisible” failure 
modes may include use of pure tin solder, trapped particles, ionic contamination, corrosion, poor 
wire bonding, inconsistent wire bonding, lack of strain relief in wire bonds, intermetallic growth, 
cracked or damaged dice, counterfeit parts, defective materials, inadequate soldering, inadequate 
die attach, etc. 
Lot Qualification: A qualification regime performed on a subsample of a homogeneous group—
or lot—of parts such that the results of the qualification regime demonstrate with high 
confidence that an acceptably large proportion of the parts in the lot will meet qualification 
requirements. Lot qualification is performed when the qualification regime is destructive to the 
test parts and when inter-lot variability is much larger than intra-lot variability. Often a model 
will be assumed or prescribed allowing test results to be extrapolated into general statements 
about lot performance. Parts used for qualification shall have passed screening to ensure that 
qualification is performed on a sample representative of flight parts. Some qualification tests 
may be destructive. 
MIL-Spec Part: Part qualified to either a performance specification (MIL-PRF-XXXX) or a 
detail specification (MIL-DTL-XXXX) (e.g., MIL-PRF-38534 Performance Specification for 
hybrid microcircuits, MIL-DTL-38999 for circular connector).  
Parts Burn-in: A test in which a part is applied with an electrical load (voltage or current) at an 
elevated temperature at piece parts level for a specified number of hours. It is an accelerated 
aging process in an attempt to stress the part at maximum rated or elevated operating conditions 
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in order to reveal thermally and electrically activated time-dependent failure modes and/or 
defects which cause early or extrinsic failures.  
Parts Characterization: Process of testing a sample of components over a range of 
environmental and application conditions to determine the ranges of key electrical parameter 
values that can be expected of all produced components of the type tested. Parts characterization 
results are often used as a basis to establish lot qualification tests.  
Parts Qualification: Sample based mechanical, electrical, and environmental tests at part-level 
intended to verify that materials, design, performance, and long-term reliability of the part on the 
same production line are consistent with the specification and intended application until a major 
process change. 
Parts Screening: A series of tests and inspections at part-level intended to remove 
nonconforming and/or infant mortal parts (parts with defects that are likely to result in early 
and/or cluster failures) and thus increase confidence in the reliability of the parts selected for use. 
Prototype hardware: Hardware of a new design; it is subject to a design qualification test 
program; it is not intended for flight. 
Proto-flight hardware: Flight hardware of a new design it is subject to a qualification test 
program that combines elements of prototype and flight acceptance verification, that is, 
application of design qualification test levels and flight acceptance test duration.  
Traceability: An identifiable association between hardware items or processes, such as between 
a requirement and the source of the requirement or between a verification method and its base 
requirement. 
8.0 Acronyms List 
AEC   Automotive Electronics Council  
AlCl3  Aluminum Chloride 
ASIC   Application-Specific Integrated Circuit  
BAT  Burst Alert Telescope 
CCF  Common-Cause Failures 
CMOS  Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor 
COTS   Commercial-Off-The-Shelf  
DARPA Defense Advance Research Project Agency  
DDD   Displacement Damage Dose  
DPA   Destructive Physical Analysis  
EEE   Electrical, Electronic, Electro-mechanical  
ELC  Express Logistics Carrier 
ESD  Electrostatic Discharge 
eV  Electron-Volt 
FPGA  Field Programmable Gate Array  
HCl  Hydrogen Chloride 
LET  Linear Energy Transfer 
LOC   Loss of Crew  
LOM   Loss of Mission  
MEAL  Mission Environment, Applications and Lifetime  
MIB  Mishap Investigation Board  
MOSFET Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistor 
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NESC   NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
NSRL   NASA Space Radiation Laboratory  
OEM  Original Equipment Manufacturer  
OM  Original Manufacturer 
PLD  Programmable Logic Device 
RF  Radio Frequency 
SEB  Single-Event Burnout 
SEE   Single-Event Effect  
SEL   Single Event Latch-up  
SLS   Space Launch System  
SOTA   State-of-the-Art  
SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random-Access Memory 
SRAM  Static Random Access Memory 
SRB  Solid Rocket Booster 
SSP  Space Shuttle Program 
STS  Space Transportation System 
TID   Total Ionizing Dose  
TRL  Test Readiness Level 
UVT  Ultraviolet 
Appendices 
A.  Matrix for a Set of Common Verification Tests and Inspections: Purposes, Capabilities, 
Advantages and Limitations of Each Verification Performed at Different Level of 
Integration 
B. Counterfeit Parts 
C. Team List 
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Appendix A. Matrix for a Set of Common Verification Tests and Inspections: 
Purposes, Capabilities, Advantages and Limitations of Each Verification 
Performed at Different Level of Integration 
A.1 Matrix header definitions 
Purpose: Reason(s) for which the given test or inspection is performed. The test or inspection 
addresses each condition (elements) listed under the purpose. 
Configuration Levels: Describes part-level, board-level, and box-level. 
Capabilities: Describes the ability of the test or inspection to address the elements listed under 
the purpose, for a given configuration level. 
Advantages: Highlights the additional tangible and/or intangible benefits of the given test or 
inspection when performed under the given configuration level. 
Limitations: Describes the shortcomings of the test or inspection (when performed under the 
given configuration level) to fully exercise the elements of the purpose and/or, any incurred risks 
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 
Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations 
All tests in general 
To verify that the 






throughout life of 
the mission. 
1) Lowest level of 
integration where 
the parts 
specifications can be 
verified. 
1) All parts 
specifications can 
typically be verified 
at this level. 
2) Parts could be 




3) Test can be 
optimized to reveal 
particular failure 
mode(s). 
1) May not be able 
to verify parts 
interactions with 
other parts in a 
system/subsystem. 




1) Next lowest level 
of integration where 
the functional 
performance of a 
circuit (consisting of 
multiple parts on a 
board) can be 
verified.  
2) May verify quality 
of workmanship. 
1) All circuit 
functionality can 
typically be verified at 
this level, including 
part interactions. 
2) May have selected 
access to some in-
circuit functions 





limited by the 
weakest part 
within the circuit 
and/or the hottest 
element within the 
board (thus not 
able to verify all 
parts manufacturer 
specifications). 




3) May not be able 
to verify external 
circuit interactions 
with other circuits 
in a 
system/subsystem. 
4) May not be able 
to identify 
degraded/damaged 
part. Access to 
input/output of all 
parts may be 
limited and may be 
affected by other 
parts within the 
circuit. 
1) Next Lowest level of integration of a system (i.e., subsystem/box) 
where the functional performance of a multiple circuits (each circuit 
consisting of multiple components on a board) can be verified.  
2) May verify quality of workmanship. 
1) Most circuit 
functionality can 
typically be 



























element within the 
box. 




3) May not be able 
to verify box 
interactions with 
other boxes in a 
subsystem/system. 
4) Difficult to 
troubleshoot thus 
may not be able to 
identify degraded 
or defective part. 
Access to 
input/output of all 
parts may be 
limited and may be 
affected by other 
parts. 
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 






To detect test units 











degradation likely to 
impact performance 





dose rate, etc.); 
ensures ELDRS 
susceptible parts 
tested at low dose 
rate and accelerated 
testing of CMOS 
technologies.  
4) Sample size can 
be selected to allow 
bounding of worst-
case degradation for 
the population.  
5) Allows 
determination of 
design margins and 
design of spot 
shielding and other 
mitigations. 
3) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based 
qualification.  
4) Cost and 
schedule impact 
for testing every 
part. 
5) Parts tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  
6) May be difficult 
or impossible to 
exercise part in 
flight-like 
conditions.  
7) May have to 
shield active parts 
of test hardware. 
3) Identifies TID 
failures likely to 
impact board-level 
operations. 
3) Replaces several 
part-level tests with a 
single board-level 
test, saving cost and 
schedule.  
4) Observed failures 
are relevant with little 
circuit or other 
analysis required. 
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part-level test. 
6) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based qualification.  
7) Boards tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  
8) Test sample 
limited only to 
parts on board and 
may not be 
representative of 
flight parts. 
9) If any ELDRS 
susceptible 
technologies are 
present, testing will 
have to be at low 
dose rate. 
10) Conditions are 
limited to "flight-
like". 
11) TID levels 
limited by the 
weakest part, and 
so cannot establish 
margins for other 










margins to failure. 
3) May detect TID failures likely to impact box-level operations. 
4) Replaces 
several part- or 
board-level tests 
with a single 
box-level test, 





little circuit or 
other analysis 
required. 
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part- or board-level 
test.  
6) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based qualification.  
7) Boxes tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  
8) Test sample 
limited only to 
parts on box and 
may not be 
representative of 
flight parts. 
9) If any ELDRS 
susceptible 
technologies are 
present, testing will 
have to be at low 
dose rate. 
10) Conditions are 
limited to "flight-
like".  
11) TID levels 
limited by the 
weakest part, and 
so cannot establish 
margins for other 










margins to failure. 
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 





To detect test units 




disruption of the 
semiconductor 





degradation likely to 
impact performance 
due to DD. 
3) Sample size can 
be selected to allow 
bounding of worst-
case degradation for 
the parts 
population. 
3) Testing every 
part may be time-
consuming, 
impacting cost and 
schedule. 
4) Parts tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test 
and used for 
sample based 
qualification.  
3) May detect DD 
failures likely to 
impact board level 
operations.  
4) Establishes 
margins for weakest 
part(s) on board. 
3) Replaces several 
part-level tests with a 
single board-level 
test, saving cost and 
schedule.  
4) Observed failures 
are relevant with little 
circuit or other 
analysis required. 
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part-level test. 
6) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based qualification.  
7) Boards tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  
8) Test sample 
limited only to 
parts on board and 
may not be 
representative of 
parts LOT due to 
part-to-part 
variations. 
9) Conditions are 
limited to "flight-
like".  
10) DD limited by 
the weakest part, 
and so cannot 
establish margins 
for other parts on 





11) If multiple 
technologies 










margins to failure.  
3) May identify DD failures likely to impact box-level operations; 




level tests with a 
single box-level 
test, saving cost 




little circuit or 
other analysis 
required. 
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part-level test. 
6) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based qualification.  
7) Boxes tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  
8) Test sample 
limited only to 
parts on board and 
may not be 
representative of 
parts LOT. 
9) Conditions are 
limited to "flight-
like".  
10) DD limited by 
the weakest part, 
so cannot establish 
margins for other 
parts in system 




11) If multiple 
technologies 










margins to failure.  
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 











susceptibility of the 
test units to SEE 
modes which are 
caused by ions 
from the radiation 
environment.  
1) SEE can occur at 
any time during the 
mission, it is critical 
that an SEE test 
reveal as many of 
the part's SEE 
susceptibilities as 
possible so their 
consequences can 
be assessed and 







goal. This is a SEE 
susceptibility test 
and should not be 
interpreted as a 
test to reproduce 
the mission 




susceptibilities of the 
test part that may 





test conditions can 











be used to develop 
mitigation;  
6) Test data can be 
used to estimate 
SEE rates for any 
environment.  
7) Can also yield 
conservative 
bounding rates for 
proton SEE. 
8) Test data are 
used to characterize 
SEE consequences 
and probabilities of 
occurrence.  
3) Cost and 
schedule impact 
for testing every 
part.   
4) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based 
qualification.  
5) Parts tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  
6) Test facilities 
have limited time 
available and are 
expensive.   
7) Many parts 
require extensive 
modification or 
use of expensive 
ultra-high energy 
ion accelerator for 





susceptibilities of the 
overall circuit that 
may occur in the 
radiation 
environment.  
4) Rarely done at 








ion testing is 
immature. See 
limitations.)  
3) May save cost and 
schedule over part-
level testing; Replaces 
several part-level 
tests with a single 
board-level test saving 
cost and schedule.   




5) failures observed 
are relevant with little 
circuit or other 
analysis required;  
5) Rarely done at 
board level. Failure 
detected at this 
level may have a 
negative impact on 
cost and schedule 




6) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 




ion testing is 
immature. 
8) Boards tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  
9) Methodology for 
board-level heavy-




ion beam and 
detailed 
information about 
part materials and 
construction for 
rate estimation.  
10) Impact due to 
SEE may depend on 
state of the board 
when it occurs;  
11) Different parts 
may have different 
worst-case ion and 
application 
conditions.   
12) May be difficult 
to identify which 
part caused a 
board-level failure. 
N/A N/A N/A 
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 






susceptibility of the 
test units to SEE 
modes caused by 
proton induced 
recoil ions and 
bound proton rates 
for the 
environment.   
1) SEE can occur at 
any time during the 
mission, it is critical 
that an SEE test 
reveal as many of 
the part's SEE 
susceptibilities as 
possible so their 
consequences can 








goal. This is a SEE 
susceptibility test 
and should not be 
interpreted as a 
test to reproduce 
the mission 
environment.     





susceptibilities of the 
part that can be 
caused by proton-
induced recoil ions in 
the mission 
environment.   
3) Bound SEE rates 
due to protons in the 
mission 
environment. 
4) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based qualification.  





5) Protons are 
highly penetrating 
and they will reach 
the device Sensitive 
Volume, thus parts 
do not need to be 
modified.   
6) SEE 
consequences can 
be used to develop 
mitigation and data 
can be used to 
estimate proton 
rates. 
   
3) Cost and 
schedule impact 
for testing every 
part. 
4) Parts tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  
5) Will require 
fluence of 3E12 to 




due to TID.  









7) Lack of control 
of proton recoil 
ion characteristics 
does not facilitate 
understanding of 
SEE mechanisms.   





parts that can be 
caused by protons 




level function.  
4) Bound SEE rates 
due to protons in the 
mission 
environment. 
3) Typical proton 
beam covers large 
area of the board thus 
multiple parts can be 
tested all at once. 
4) Protons are highly 
penetrating, thus 
testing does not 
require modification 
of parts on board.   
5) Errors observed will 
be important at the 
board level.  
6) Test can be 
conducted for more-
or-less realistic flight-
like conditions.   
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part level. 
6) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based qualification.  
7) Boards tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  
8) Failure of a part 
may prevent seeing 
other board 
susceptibilities. 
9) May miss some 
destructive SEE. 
10) Errors may 
depend on the on 
state of board at 
when error occurs; 
an undetected 
error mode might 
have more severe 
consequences if it 
occurred when the 
board was in 
another state. 







SEE susceptibilities.   
12) Will require 
fluence of 3E12 to 




due to TID. 
13) May not be 
able to identify 
degraded/damaged 
component/part, 
since access to 
input/output of all 
parts may be 
limited and may be 
affected by other 
2) Identifies proton induced nondestructive and destructive SEE 
susceptibilities of parts that can be caused by protons induced recoil ions 
in the mission environment and that affect box level function.  
3) Bound SEE rates due to protons in the mission environment. 




does not require 
modification of 
parts on board.   
5) Errors 
observed will be 
important at the 
box level.  




like conditions.   
5) Failure of a part 
may prevent seeing 
other box level 
susceptibilities. 
6) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part level. 
7) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based qualification.  
8) Boxes tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  
9) May miss some 
destructive SEE. 
10) Errors may 
depend on the on 
state of box at 
when error occurs; 
an undetected 
error mode might 
have more severe 
consequences if it 
occurred when the 
box was in another 
state. 







SEE susceptibilities.   
12) Will require 
fluence of 3E12 to 




due to TID. 
13) May not be 
able to identify 
degraded/damaged 
part, since access 
to input/output of 
all parts may be 
limited and may be 
affected by other 
parts. 
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 
Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations 
parts. 
14) Lack of control 




SEE mechanisms.   
14) Lack of control 




SEE mechanisms.   
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 







test units to SEE 
modes, and to 
identify the 






susceptibilities of the 
test part that may 
occur in the 
radiation 
environment.           
3) Identifies features 
responsible for each 
SEE mode -- useful 
for SEE hardening of 
part design.          
4) Yields some 
information on rate 
(SEE at lower laser 
energy will be more 
common in space). 
4) Identifies SEE 
susceptibilities in 
part.                                                        
5) Identifies 
features responsible 
for each SEE mode.                                      
6) Yields some 
limited information 
about cross section 
and onset LET.      
7) Laser does not 
contribute to TID, so 
TID/SEE synergies 
do not affect test 
results. 
8) Laser time 
cheaper than 
proton or heavy-ion 





ion testing and very 
useful for first look, 
hardening studies or 
very complex parts. 
3) Cannot 
penetrate metals 
or thick overlayers, 
so may not identify 
all SEE 
susceptibilities.                               
4) Resolution 
limited by laser 
beam spot size.                                                                     
5) No direct 
relationship 
between laser 
intensity and LET.                                       





Not possible at 
higher levels of 
integration. 
N/A N/A Not possible at higher levels of integration. N/A N/A 
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 









susceptibility of the 
test units to SEE 
modes caused by 




rates for the 
environment.   
1) SEE can occur at 
any time during the 
mission, it is critical 
that an SEE test 
reveal as many of 
the part's SEE 
susceptibilities as 
possible so their 
consequences can 
be assessed and 







goal.   







environments.   
3) Highly penetrating 
proton beams 
ensure some recoil 
ions generated in 
some SV of parts 
without extensive 
modification needed 
for most heavy-ion 
testing provided 
proton fluence is 
high enough. 








3) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based 
qualification.  





rates for all 
technologies or all 
SEE modes.  
5) Low recoil-ion 
production rate 
means TID limits 
fluence that can be 
used. 
6) Parts tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  







environments.   
4) Highly penetrating 
proton beams 
ensure some recoil 
ions generated in 
some SV of parts 
without extensive 
modification needed 
for most heavy-ion 
testing provided 
proton fluence is 
high enough. 
3) Long proton ranges 
ensure exposure of 
some SV to recoil ions 
with no modification 
needed to board or 
parts and with parts 
on the board 
operating in "flight-
like" manner. 
4) Allows testing of 
complicated parts 
without extensive 
modification or access 
to an expensive, high-
energy heavy-ion 
accelerator. 
5) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based qualification.  





rates for all 
technologies or all 
SEE modes.   
7) Different SV 
depths of parts on 
board mean that 
effect of limited 
range varies from 
part to part; each 
part experiences a 
different 
equivalent heavy-
ion environment.  
8) Low recoil-ion 
production rate 
means TID limits 
fluence that can be 
used.   
9) Weakest part to 
TID degradation 
limits proton 
fluence for entire 
board.  
10) Limited ability 
to optimize 
application 
conditions for each 
part to detect SEE 
modes associated 
with its technology.   
11) Whether a SEE 
mode is detected 
at the board level 
may depend on the 
board's state when 
it occurs; the mode 
might have more 
severe 
consequences if it 
occurred when the 
board was in 
another state.   
12) Boards tested 
cannot be used for 
flight since it is a 
destructive test.  
3) Places limited constraints on heavy-ion nondestructive SEE 
susceptibility for benign mission environments.   
4) Long proton ranges ensure that recoil ions will reach some SV of parts 
in the subsystem.   
4) Long proton 
ranges ensure 
exposure of 
some SV in all 
parts in the 
system to recoil 
ions with no 
modification 
needed to board 
or parts and 
with parts in the 
box operating in 
"flight-like" 
manner. 
5) Same as for 
board-level testing, 
except fluence now 
limited by weakest 
part in box and 
ability to tailored 
application 
conditions to best 
reveal SEE 
susceptibilities is 
even more limited. 
6) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based qualification.  
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 
Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations 
Electrical, Parametric, and 
Functional at Room and 
Operating at Extreme 
Temperatures 
To verify electrical 
performance of the 
test unit and 
determine design 
margins.  
2) Establish health 
check by functional 
testing. 
3) Test the following 
parameters: 
a) Output source 
load capability 
b) input load sink 
capability 










4) Is a non-
destructive test and 
typically used for 
qual and 100% 
screening. 
5) Helps establishing 
and understanding 
of the margin, 
trending 
performance, and 
proximity to failure. 
6) Allows 
Verification of 
parametric at part 
level. 
7) Establishes 
robustness of part. 
Ability to eliminate 
outliers regarding 
performance. 
8) Allows detection 
of some counterfeit 
products. 
9) Detects part-to-
part and lot to lot 
variability. 
3) Cost and 
schedule impact 
for testing every 
part. 
4) Potential 
damage due to 
handling. 




6) May miss some 
counterfeit parts. 





specs at early 
assembly verification 
stages. 
3) Is a non-destructive 
test and typically used 
for qual and 100% 
screening. 






common mode noise, 
and source overload, 
to meet its expected 
design requirements. 
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part level. 
6) Handling of the 
board may lead to 
damage.  
7) Accidental test 
exceedances may 
lead to parts 
damages. 
8) Board(s) with 
regulated power 









3) Verifies box performance against mission requirements or box 
manufacturer specs prior to system integration and system verification.   
3) Is a non-
destructive test 
and typically 
used for qual 
and 100% 
screening. 









source overload.  
5) Tests 
performed at 











within the box. 
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part and board 
level. 
6) Handling of the 
box may lead to 
damage.  
7) Accidental test 
exceedances may 
lead to parts 
damages. 
8) Test limited to 
box temperature 
and voltage specs 
and associated 
derating. Not all 
parts tested to 
their spec limit. 
Box(s) with 
regulated power 













performance of the 
test unit under 
thermal stress to 














material issues (done 
in conjunction with 
parametric testing). 
4) Is a non-
destructive test and 
typically used for 
sample based qual 
and 100% screening. 
5) Allows maximum 
rated thermal 
extremes to be 
tested 
6) Eliminates parts 







lifecycle test (done 
in conjunction with 
parametric testing). 
3) Cost and 
schedule impact 
for testing every 
part.  
4) Handling of the 
parts may lead to 
damage.  
5) Accidental test 
exceedances may 
lead to parts 
damages. 
6) Can use a 





3) Tests powered 
board to detect 
workmanship, 
performance and 
material issues when 
testing at 




(typically lower than 
component limits). 
3) Is a non-destructive 
test and typically used 
for sample based qual 
and 100% screening. 
4) Verifies board 
performance, 
workmanship and 
material against the 
board design limits 
based on the mission 
requirements. 
5) Verifies board 
thermal model. 
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part level. 
6) Handling of the 
board may lead to 
damage.  
7) Accidental test 
exceedances may 
lead to parts 
damages. 
8) Can use a 
portion of the life. 




3) Tests powered box to detect workmanship, performance and material 
issues when testing at temperature at the box design temperature and 
voltage limits (typically lower than component limits). 
4) Is a non-
destructive test 
and typically 
used for sample 
based qual and 
100% screening. 




against the box 
design limits 
based on the 
mission 
requirements. 
6) Verifies box 
thermal model. 
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part and board 
level. 
6) Handling of the 
box may lead to 
damage.  
7) Accidental test 
exceedances may 
lead to parts 
damages. 
8) Can use a 
portion of the life. 
9) No insight into 
component 
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 




To verify the test 
unit performance 
over the rated 
operating 
temperature range, 













3) Not intended as a 
destructive test and 
typically used in a 
sample based 
qualification test and 
100% screening. 
4) Allows parts to be 
tested at maximum 
rated thermal 
extremes. 
5) Eliminates parts 





6) Allows for 
accelerated test to 
eliminate infant 
mortals.  
3) Cost and 
schedule impact 
for testing every 
part. . 
4) Handling of the 
parts may lead to 
damage.  
5) Accidental test 
exceedances may 
lead to parts 
damages. 
6) Can use a 
portion of the life. 
3) Tests 
unpowered/powered 
board to detect 
workmanship, 
performance and 




4) Not intended as a 
destructive test and 
typically used in a 
sample based 
qualification test and 
100% screening. 
3) May detect board 
level workmanship 
issues at an early 
stage of assembly. 
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part level. 
6) Handling of the 
board may lead to 
damage.  
7) Accidental test 
exceedances may 
lead to parts 
damages. 
8) Can use a 
portion of the life. 
9) Limited by the 
design spec. 
3) Test unpowered/powered box to detect workmanship, performance 
and material issues when testing at temperature extremes. 
4) Not intended as a destructive test and typically used in a sample based 
qualification test and 100% screening. 




5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part and board 
level. 
6) Handling of the 
box may lead to 
damage.  
7) Accidental test 
exceedances may 
lead to parts 
damages. 
8) Can use a 
portion of the life. 




performance of the 
test unit under 
thermal stress in a 
vacuum condition 
to ensure the test 




2) Typically not 
performed at part 
level.  
3) Not intended as a 
destructive test and 
typically used for 
qual or acceptance. 
N/A N/A 
3) Typically not 
performed at board 
level.  
4) Not intended as a 
destructive test and 
typically used for 
qual or acceptance. 
N/A N/A 
2) Verifies the box's thermal-electrical and mechanical performance under 
vacuum conditions. 
3) Not intended as a destructive test and typically used for qual or 
acceptance. 
3) Verifies circuit 
electrical 
performance. 










TVAC chamber and 
test facilities. 
6) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part level. 
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 
Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations 
Vibration/Shock/Constant 
Acceleration 
To verify the ability 











sensitive part types 
(magnetics, wet 
tantalum caps, large 
ferrite or ceramic 
components, hybrid 
circuits, etc.). 
3) Typically used as a 
sample based lot 
qualification test. For 
100% screening test, 
constant 
acceleration test is 
typically chosen 
instead of 
vibration/shock test.  






3) Cost and 
schedule impact 
for testing every 
part. 
4) Handling of the 
parts may lead to 
damage.  
3) Typically 
performed at box 
level and/or higher 
integration testing. 





3) Can detect and 
mitigate mechanical 
workmanship and 
design issues at the 
board level, allowing 
early redesign or 
corrective actions as 
needed prior to box 
level integrations.  
4) Allows visual and 
electrical 
inspection/verification 
(e.g., Solder joints, 
wire and harness 
defects, bonding 
strength of large 
mechanical 
components, etc.). 
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 





7) Requires proper 
fixturing to avoid 
damage and impart 
realistic vibration 
loads. 






2) Used to identify some mechanical workmanship defects at the box 
level. 
3) Used to verify the mechanical integrity of the box. 










needed, prior to 
system 
integration. 
5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 





7) Requires proper 
fixturing to avoid 
damage and impart 
realistic vibration 
loads. 
8) Limited to no 
visual inspection 
thus may miss 
some work 
workmanship 
issues such as 
cracked solder 
joints, etc., or 
other design issues. 











To verify the test 
units' sensitivity to 
damage from 
moisture. 
2) Identifies parts 
susceptible to 
moisture damage. 
3) Not intended as a 
destructive test and 
typically used for 
sample based qual. 
4) Eliminates 
unsuitable part lots 
early before higher-
level design & 
integration. 
3) Cost and 
schedule impact 
for testing every 
part. 
4) Is a destructive 
test. 
5) Typically applied 




epoxy based seals, 
solid tantalum chip 
caps, etc...). 
N/A N/A N/A       
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 
Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations 
EMI/EMC 
To verify that the 
design and 
workmanship of 
the test units will 






and external due to 
natural sources or 
non-natural 
sources.  
2) Not typically 
performed at the 
part level. 
N/A N/A 
2) At this level of 
integration, the test 








3) Can detect and 
mitigate conducted 
susceptibilities and/or 
emissions of boards 
with internal power 




emissions could be 
performed outside 
EMI chamber on a lab 
bench. 




emissions of an 
individual board.  
6) No interactions 
of an integrated 
box (i.e., multiple 
boards) or system. 
7) Test 
performance may 
not represent the 




performed at the 
box levels of 
assembly, followed 
by EMI/EMC 













3) Verifies potential electrical susceptibilities caused when the box is 
exposed to conducted or radiated electromagnetic emissions, and verifies 
potential interferences (radiated and/or conducted emissions) generated 
from the box.  







emissions of box 
at early box 
verification 
stages. 
































6) Check for 
Electromagnetic 
Susceptibility 
that may lead to 
undesired 
response by a 
box, or system 
when exposed 




5) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
board level. 
6) Accidental test 
exceedances may 




8) No interactions 
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 
Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations 
PIND (Particle Impact 
Noise Detection) Test 
To detect loose 
particles and debris 
inside cavity device 




2) Not intended as a 
destructive test and 
typically used for 
qual and 100% 
screening. 
3) Detects loose 
particles and/or 
debris inside cavity 
devises. 
4) Is an indicator of 
manufacturer 
workmanship. 
4) Allows early 
removal of parts 
with foreign object 
debris (FOD) 
contamination. 
5) Can be used in 
failure analysis to 
capture particle and 
determine 
contamination 
source to qualify or 
disqualify a lot. 
6) Detects some 
workmanship issues 
within part. 
7) Is a quick and 
inexpensive test. 
Negligible cost and 
schedule impact for 
testing every part. 
3) Handling of the 
parts may lead to 
damage.  
4) Test imparts a 
significant shock 
load on the part, 
and may not be 
appropriate for 
overly shock 
sensitive parts.  
5) Cannot be 
performed on 
potted or PEMs 
devices. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Leak Test 
To verify hermetic 
parts are properly 
sealed.  
2) Not intended as a 
destructive test and 
typically used for 
qual and 100% 
screening to identify 
lid seal or 
hermeticity defective 
parts. 
3) Tests for Fine and 
Gross leak rates.   
4) Early removal of 
parts with defective 
seals that could 
cause moisture 
intrusion, corrosion 
and latent failures. 
5) Is a quick and 
inexpensive test. 
Negligible cost and 
schedule impact for 
testing every part 
3) Handling of the 
parts may lead to 
damage.  
4) Requires piece 
parts and special 
fixturing to detect 
leak rates. 
5) Cannot apply to 
non-hermetic 
parts. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Bond Pull Test  





DPA for assembled 
units or in process 
by manufacturer. 
3) Verifies strength 
and quality of wire 
bonding, and 
provides insight into 






4) Verifies wire 
bond process 
consistency. 
5) Verifies the 
strength of material 
and bond. 
6) Early elimination 
of parts with poor 
bonding. 
3) Cost and 
schedule impact 
for testing sample 
parts. 
4) Handling of the 
parts may lead to 
damage.  
5) Is a destructive 
test and typically 





bond pull test 
returns limited 
data.  Certain part 
types (RF) may not 
be appropriate for 
even non-destruct 
bond pull. 
6) Only able to be 
performed at the 
part level. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 






over what would 
be experienced in 
the early lifecycle 
of a test unit. 
2) Not intended as a 
destructive test for 
majority of the parts 
but destructive for 
defective parts. 
3) Used for parts 
qual and 100% 
screening. 
4) Removes infant 
mortals of the given 
parts manufacturing 
lot, including 
functional failure and 
parametric 
degradation, by 
accelerating the life 
of the parts outside 
the infant mortal 










appropriate for the 
part. 
6) Gives confidence 





3) Cost and 
schedule impact 
for testing every 
part. 
4) Handling of the 
parts may lead to 
damage.  
5) Accidental test 
exceedances may 
lead to parts 
damages. 
6) Some parts may 
require additional 
complex circuitry 
to support the 
test. 
3) May remove some 
board containing 
infant mortal parts.  
4) Able to trend the 
overall circuit 
performance of the 
board at elevated 
condition.  
3) Less schedule 
impact vs. part level 
burn in, if there is no 
failure. 
4) Lower aggregated 
cost per part. Can test 
multiple parts types at 
one time. 
5) Allows complex 
parts burn-in without 
sophisticated test 
fixture.  
6) Reduces chance of 
over testing condition.  
5) Temperature 
stress is limited by 
the part with the 
lowest maximum 
temperature of any 
part on the board. 
Voltage stress 
acceleration is 
limited by nominal 
board operating 
voltage, which is 
typically derated.  
Both voltage and 
temperature 
conditions will lead 
to much lower 
acceleration factors 
than the part level.   
6) Parametric 
characteristics of 
the parts are 
limited to 
input/output 
interfaces of the 
board. 
7) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 
as compared to 
part-level test. 
3) May remove some boxes with infant mortal parts.  




stress is limited by 
the part with the 
lowest maximum 
temperature of any 
part on the box. 
Voltage stress 
acceleration is 
limited by nominal 
box operating 
voltage which is 
typically derated.  
Both voltage and 
temperature 
conditions will lead 
to much lower 
acceleration factors 
than the part and 
board level.   
6) Parametric 
characteristics of 
the parts are 
limited to 
input/output 
interfaces of the 
box. 
7) Failure detected 
at this level may 
have a negative 
impact on cost and 
schedule due to 
level of integration 




To verify the lack of 
defects in sealed 
test units. 
2) Ability to measure 
die attach coverage, 
and detect damaged 
or misplaced wire 
bonds, and voiding 
or lid seal defects.  
3) Allows detection 
of counterfeit parts 
and lot 
homogeneity. 
4) Is a 
nondestructive 
screening test. 
5) Is the only 
nondestructive way 
to provide the 
internal visual 
inspection of the 
part. 
6) Assesses lot 
homogeneity to 
provide assurance 
that sampled based 
tests (radiation, life, 
humidity, etc.) are 
using a valid 
representation of 
the population. 
3) Cost and 
schedule impact 
by testing every 
part. 
4) Handling of the 
parts may lead to 
damage.  
5) Aluminum wire 
bonds are harder 
to see, certain 
materials may not 
be visible, and may 
not be able to 
detect cracks. 




density solder joints 
on CGAs and other 
devices).   




3) Is a nondestructive 
evaluation.  








4) Requires larger 
X-ray machine, will 
get limited insight 
into internal parts 
issues, and stack up 
of boards and 
other parts 
interference can 
obstruct image.  




6) Can contribute 
to TID. 
3) Typically not done at box level. N/A N/A 
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   Level of Integration 
Test Purpose 
Part-level testing and screening Board-level testing Box-level testing 
Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations Capability Advantages Limitations 
Destructive Physical 
Analysis (DPA) /  Internal 
Visual Inspection 
To verify integrity 
of the parts. 
2) Identifies internal 
physical 
workmanship 




material, die, wire 
and/or ball grid array 
bonding, 
contamination.) 
4) Can discover 
reliability issues (not 
visible externally) 




5) Can identify 
counterfeit parts 
and malware.  
6) Done in parallel 
with other qual 
tests. 
3) Is a destructive 
test and typically 
used for sample 
based 
qualification. 
4) For expensive 
parts, the decision 
to perform the test 
must balance 
application 
criticality, risk and 
cost of the 
samples. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 External Visual 
Inspection 
To identify and 
inspect the test 
units to ensure no 
visible damage.  
2) Identifies external 
physical 
workmanship 







material, etc.),  
counterfeits, tin 
whiskers, etc. 
4) Is a non-
destructive test and 









3) Cost and 
schedule impact 
for testing every 
part. 
4) Handling of the 
parts may lead to 
damage. 
3) Identifies board's 
external physical 
workmanship 
defects and handling 
damages, proper 






material, etc.),  some 
counterfeits, tin 
whiskers, as well as 
solder and assembly 
defects. 
3) Is a non-destructive 
test and typically used 
for 100% screening. 
4) Better visibility for 
inspection. 
5) Can detect board 
assembly defects 




interferences, etc.) at 
early stages before 
power is applied to 
the board. 
5) Handling of the 
board may lead to 
damage.  
6) Can only see 
what is not covered 
by the parts. 
7) Limited 
capability to detect 
counterfeits. 
3) Identifies external workmanship issues and defects or damages of the 
box.  
4) Ensures no 
external 
workmanship 
issues or defects 
or damages.  
5) Cannot identify 
part and board 
workmanship 
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Appendix B. Counterfeit Parts 
The continuous growth of the electronics industry has made it extremely attractive for unscrupulous people 
to take advantage of the industry’s success for their own personal gain by copying and reproducing/faking 
the industry’s intellectual property.  Unscrupulous gains range from monetary to embedding of malicious 
code or malware within microelectronics.  Thus, counterfeiters can profit by strategies far more insidious 
that merely copying intellectual property, including addition of malicious (Trojan) malware (code or 
circuitry), which can harm the end user and/or the industry reputation. In some other cases, parts that have 
been scavenged from other circuits (under unknown conditions) or discarded by the manufacturer as not 
meeting the respective specifications, have found their way into the supply chain. 
B.1 Common Distributors’ Definitions 
Distributor or Independent Distributor  A company, agent, or entity who buys, warehouses and resells 
goods to retailers and other businesses that sell to end users.  The 
distributor does not have any ownership or relationship with the 
original manufacturer. 
Authorized or Franchise Distributors A distributor who has legal contractual agreements with the 
original manufacturer, which give the right to market or sell goods 
or services under the trademarked name, or patented process.  It 
meets the requirements from the original manufacturer to represent, 
buy, store, and sell/distribute their product to the end users.  
B.2 Myths and Misconceptions of Counterfeit Parts 
There are many myths and misconceptions that could lead NASA programs to not detect counterfeit parts 
and become affected by the inadvertent introduction of these parts as well as other parts (e.g., nuts, screws, 
washers, etc.).  The following summarizes some myths and misconceptions extracted from “The Role of 
Hardware Security in Product Reliability” by Kerry Bernstein of the Defense Advance Research Project 
Agency (DARPA) and “Ruminations, Myths and Unreliable Facts,” by Henry Livingston of BAE Systems. 
Also included are statements from “To Buy or Not to Buy from Independent Distributors” by James 
Carbourne.  
 Authorized distributors: 
o Myth: “Authorized Distributors perform inspection / verification of “returns for convenience” 
that will detect counterfeits,” 
o Myth: “Counterfeits do not find their way into the supply chain via Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) “excess inventory,”  
o Myth: “Counterfeits do not find their way into the supply chain via authorized distributors.” 
o Myth: “Only bad distributors sell counterfeit components.” 
 Fact: Most counterfeit parts sold to contractors come from independent distributors 
lacking effective screening techniques 
 Fact: Independent Distributors say that from 0.5% to 35% of their incoming product is 
suspected counterfeit. 
 Fact: Counterfeit parts have made their way to the supply chain through customer 
returns to authorized distributors. 
 Fact: “While “OEM” companies may buy the bulk of the components that they need for 
production directly from semiconductor and other component manufacturers, they also 
purchase some parts from distributors, both authorized and independent, especially if 
parts are in short supply.”17 
 Typical Counterfeited Parts: 
o Myth: “Only expensive components are counterfeited.” 
                                                        
17 http://www.sourcetoday.com/blog/buy-or-not-buy-independent-distributors; J. Carbone, “To Buy or Not to Buy from Independent 
Distributors”, March 3, 2015. 
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 Fact: Department of Commerce reports that over 60% of counterfeit parts have a sale 
value of $10 or less. 
o Myth: Only obsolete and hard-to-find parts are counterfeit.  
 Fact: Todays counterfeiters can reproduce from simple components to complex 
electronics designs. 
o Myth: “Counterfeit components are a 1-in-1,000,000 risk.” 
 Fact: Independent Distributors say that from 0.5% to 35% of their incoming product is 
suspected counterfeit. 
 
 Screening/Testing for Counterfeit Parts: 
o Myth: DPA is not necessary to reveal counterfeits. 
 Fact: Counterfeit parts may be reversed engineered devices and therefore present a 
potential opportunity for its creator to add unwanted features, which may not be 
detectable by electrical tests. 
o Myth: Simple electrical tests will detect counterfeits. 
 Fact: More than half of all counterfeit parts have the correct (or equivalent) die 
 Fact: Counterfeit parts may be identical in function and work in the application, but their 
quality and reliability is unknown (without extensive testing and screening). 
o Myth: Counterfeits can be detected by testing the next higher assembly or system. 
 Fact: Counterfeit parts may be identical in function and work in the application, but their 
quality and reliability is unknown. 
 Fact: Counterfeit parts may include reversed engineered parts and, therefore, present a 
potential opportunity for its creator to add unwanted or even malicious features.  
 Fact: Counterfeit parts may be very close in function, but fail performance parameters 
that may not be detected until the equipment containing the part is used in the field.  
B.3 Counterfeit Parts Detection 
Detecting counterfeit parts cannot be accomplished with a single test but rather requires the combination of 
several tests.  Moreover, the acquisition of the parts directly from authorized distributors reduces the 
probability of introducing counterfeit part, but does not eliminate it.  OEM that acquire some of their 
components from non-authorized distributors are vulnerable to counterfeits being introduced into their 
product line. Tests used in the detection of counterfeit parts are the same tests typically used to test/screen 
part for defects. Although many of these tests can be performed at different integration levels, the respective 
tests have limitations at higher levels of integration and these limitations reduce their effectiveness for 
detecting counterfeit parts at those levels of integration. Some typical tests include electrical parametric 
tests, external and internal (i.e., destructive) visual inspections, material verification, X-ray examinations, 
etc.   
For example:  
1) Visual inspection could identify manufacturing workmanship damages, handling damages, and 
irregularities in date codes, manufacturer logo, etc.  
2) X-ray examination could identify misplaced or wrongly shaped die, internal contamination, potential 
embedded malware, etc.  
3) Electrical parametric testing could verify the electrical specifications and functionality of the device;  
4) Internal visual inspection could identify internal workmanship defects, malware, die positioning, 
legitimate and non-legitimate die, internal contamination, etc.  
5) Material examination could detect contaminants, prohibited material, etc. 
As stated, it is the combination of the information obtained during the screening and qualification tests the 
users could use to identify potential counterfeit parts. Examples of some tests used in the detection of parts 
at different integration levels are described in Section B.4. The capabilities, advantages, and limitations of 
each test at the parts-, board-, and box-level of integration are described in the matrix in Appendix A. 
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B.4  Counterfeit Parts Identification Examples at Each Level of Integration 
1. Testing at the parts level for identification of counterfeit. The most effective counterfeit detection is 
performed at the part level. Product assurance actions include review of data deliverables, 
verification of purchase order quality clause compliance, visual inspection, electrical measurements, 
nondestructive evaluation (e.g., X-ray, hermeticity, marking permanency), and destructive testing 
(e.g., DPA, thermal cycling, and construction analysis)18. Review of data deliverables and 
verification of purchase quality clause compliance would ensure the parts are traceable to the original 
component manufacturer (OCM).  Visual inspection identifies external physical workmanship 
defects and handling damages, proper part marking, physical specifications (e.g., dimensions, 
configuration, material, etc.), tin whiskers, and other external defects. Electrical measurements verify 
part electrical parametric characteristics.  Nondestructive evaluation confirms lot homogeneity and 
detects lead finish anomalies, damaged or misplaced wire bonds, die features (e.g., size, location, 
number of die), seal defects, and other part anomalies.  Construction analysis and DPA reveal 
internal physical workmanship defects and confirm proper part physical specifications (i.e., 
configuration, material, die, wire size and material composition, and/or ball grid array material and 
bonding, contamination).  Construction analysis/DPA and electrical testing can be used to detect 
evidence of Trojan malware.   
2. Testing at the board-level for identification of counterfeits. Testing at this level offers limited 
information in the detection of counterfeits parts. For example, if no malfunction is apparent on the 
integrated circuit board, visual inspection is limited to the exposed surfaces of the parts. Visual 
inspection is used to identify board physical workmanship defects, assembly defects, handling 
damages, tin whiskers, and solder defects. In addition, it is used to verify physical specifications 
(e.g., dimensions, configuration, and materials), proper board marking, and part installation. 
Electrical tests are used to verify board performance against mission requirements or board 
manufacturer’s specifications. Testing would be limited to the general functional performance of the 
circuit board and may not identify any marginal part due to its parametric degradation or other 
defects caused by the counterfeiting process. Such parts could lead to a board malfunction. 
Nondestructive testing such as X-ray inspection would be limited by the physical construction of the 
assembled board. Construction analysis and DPA are not possible at this level of integration and 
therefore no internal information of the parts is obtainable; Trojan malware and/or substandard parts 
quality and reliability may not be detected. 
3. Testing at the box-level for identification of counterfeits. At this level of integration, testing for 
counterfeit parts would be extremely limited. A visual inspection would help identify external box 
workmanship issues and electrical testing (environmental conditions) would only provide 
performance information at the box-level. Suspect counterfeit parts may be identical in function to 
the non-counterfeit part and perform nominally in the application; however, their quality and 
reliability would be unknown. Electrical testing will most likely not identify malware within reversed 
engineered counterfeit parts, presenting a potential opportunity for the creator of the malware to add 
unwanted features and control. 
  
                                                        
18 NASA-STD-8739.10, “Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Management and Control Requirements for 
Space Flight Hardware and Critical  Ground Support Equipment”, June 2017.  
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